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THE FORTNIGHTLY

APRIL, 1949

EUROPE RISING

BY SIR HAROLD BUTLER

ONE of the characteristic symptoms of mental unbalance is, I am told, a distorted sense of time, which causes the rhythm of events to appear impossibly slow or impossibly fast. In our present state of emotional and intellectual confusion many people seem to be suffering from such a defective sense of chronology. From various quarters one hears gibes and grumbles, because Europe is so slow in uniting. There are some Americans who would like to apply Mr. Dewey's threatened technique, to push us and prod us headlong into federation in a matter of months, quite forgetting that the federating process required thirteen years even for the Thirteen Colonies, a far more homogeneous body than Europe with at least thirteen languages and a heritage of hatred and conflict, which only reached its climax ten years ago. There are quite a lot of impatient Europeans too, who think the only method of advance is to rush recklessly at the obstacles without any attempt to reconnoitre or to circumvent them. Any hint of caution is condemned as sabotage or treachery to the cause of European Union. If the British Government exhibits any trace of hesitation, it is promptly consigned to outer darkness by the more fanatical federalists, who seem eager to sever Britain from Europe and so to ensure the ultimate supremacy of Germany. And yet they bestow little blame on the patent reluctance of Switzerland to abandon her faith in neutrality, which is of course inconsistent with membership of any kind of effective European association, to say nothing of a European Federation.

But these are just the exuberances which any movement is bound to produce. They may be ignored as harmless except in so far as they distract attention from the significance of what has actually been achieved. To gauge that one has only to look back twelve months. So rapid has the pace of advance become that it is hard to realize that in February 1948 there was no Brussels Treaty, no western defence organization with Field-Marshal Montgomery at its head in Fontainebleau, no attempt to frame a long-range economic plan for Europe, no suggestion of a European Assembly. The bringing to birth of any one of these things would in a better balanced age be regarded as a very notable historical event. That they should all have been born together in a year is something more than that. It

suggests that Europe is rising once more from its ruins and is beginning to take on a new shape.

The difference between the European atmosphere then and now must have been very evident to anyone who attended the Hague Congress last May and the first meeting of the Council of the European Movement in Brussels a few weeks ago. At the Hague there was a note of rather feverish query, a doubt whether Europe could really be pulled together. The desire to begin the burial of bygones was there. The existence of a common European faith was roundly asserted. The summoning of a European Assembly was strongly advocated. But there was an overhanging question mark. Could these things be translated into terms of practical politics? At Brussels, on the other hand, there was an air of restrained confidence. The European Movement itself, now greatly extended and consolidated, was beginning to take root. The O.E.E.C. was already laying the foundations of a European economy. The nucleus of a common defence organization was in existence. The first session of the European Assembly was in sight.

At this stage it may be timely to ask why such surprising progress has been possible. The first reason that suggests itself is fear of Russia and of communist penetration. No doubt that remains a powerful stimulus, but it is not the only or perhaps even the most determining factor. The communist wave has ebbed throughout western Europe in the past year. The outcome of the Italian elections and the collapse of the strike movement in France are evident symptoms. As economic recovery has become more clearly discernible in Britain, France, Germany and Italy, social tension has sensibly relaxed, and with it the attraction of desperate remedies. At the same time the Russian peril has lost some of its terrors. The spectacle of the Berlin air-lift and the growing determination of the United States to underwrite European security have lessened the apprehension which the rape of Czechoslovakia evoked. Though it would be absurd to deny that deep-seated fears still persist, they are not the main driving force impelling Europe towards closer union. Of that the best proof is the popular distaste for its military aspects. Any suggestion that Europe is being organized for a new war is apt to arouse strong emotional opposition. The communists, who are not always blind to popular reactions, persistently denounce European unity as designed to provoke a new war against the east, because they know that the hatred and fear of war are intense throughout western Europe, including western Germany. Anyone who proposed that Europe should unite for a crusade against Russia would have short shrift.

On the other hand, if the need for military security is unduly depreciated, the necessity of closer union as a means to economic

security has become better understood. The fact that there has been a perceptible improvement in most countries of western Europe is taken as evidence that the Organization for European Economic Co-operation is beginning to produce results. Without it the use made of Marshall aid, would have been much less effective, to put the claim no higher, but it is now becoming plain that Europe cannot be saved by American help alone. The O.E.E.C. has already demonstrated that Europe cannot attain solvency by 1952 on the present lines. A greater effort is needed to restore intra-European trade, to plan its production and the production of its colonial dependencies on co-operative instead of competitive lines, to work out a common plan for bridging the dollar gap, which will otherwise threaten a sharp decline in European standards of living in three years' time. These truths are beginning to sink in, and more will be heard of them at the European Economic Conference, which is meeting in London under the auspices of the European Movement in the latter part of April. Being a totally unofficial body, its purpose will not be to solve all the problems, but rather to ventilate both the advantages and the difficulties of economic union in Europe. Hitherto they have been debated behind closed official doors. Public discussion in which economists, industrialists and trade-union leaders can freely take part should help to form an educated public opinion, upon which the success or failure of the action of governments finally depends.

In this field a great deal remains to be done. All sorts of doubts are prevalent in this country and in others, reasonable doubts most of them, which have to be brought out into the open and confronted. There is our own relationship with the Dominions. Can we join any kind of European system without jeopardizing it? If so, what kind of system and on what terms? These questions are vital not only to us, but to the Continent also, for it is becoming more and more certain that there can be no European balance, either political or economic, without the participation of Britain. Then there are the social apprehensions. What will be the effect on wage-levels and living standards if Europe becomes an open market, if full use is made of its man-power by restoring freedom of movement from one country to another? Will there be a sudden down-grading of the more advanced social systems and an up-grading of the more backward? Or will there be a slow levelling up all round as in the United States, where wide variations of wages and social conditions still subsist within the framework of a single economic system? Questions of this kind are exercising the minds of trade unionists not only here, but in most other European countries. Not less concern is felt about the possibility of reconciling the planning without which a new Europe cannot be built, and the free enterprise without which

it cannot be made a going concern. This is perhaps largely a theoretical antithesis. In point of fact no country in western Europe has, or aims at having, a totalitarian economy. Any country in which the State undertook all economic activities would be quickly enveloped by the iron curtain. On the other hand, no western European country—nor for that matter the United States—has preserved a system of pure *laissez faire* without a greater or lesser measure of government intervention in economic affairs. The solution of the dilemma does not lie in the choice of one of two absolute alternatives, but in working out a series of practical compromises, as is being done every day in every country. All these and several other bogeys have got to be laid ; it can only be done by the time-honoured method of public debate.

The impulse towards European union is not, however, derived from economic considerations alone. Closely related to them are two political ambitions. The first is to ensure peace in western Europe, which means finding a permanent solution of the German question. However grudgingly, people are coming to realize, even in France, Belgium, Holland or Denmark, that unless Germany is to be held in subjection for all time, which nobody believes possible, she must be readmitted into the European family. It is not just a question of the coal, the steel, and the fertilizers of the Ruhr, which are an essential element in any European economic system. There is the larger question of peace and war. Can Germany's old lust for conquest be extirpated and its energies enlisted in the task of rebuilding a peaceful Europe ? No one knows the answer, not even the Germans. The strident appeal of the old nationalism is being heard once more, but it has to overcome much stronger resistance than that of thirty years ago. The terrible memories of the war and its consequences are present in the minds of every German man and woman—and particularly the women, who by sheer weight of numbers play a much larger part in the national life than formerly and have no wish to return to the Nazi purdah. In the face of the menace of the east, Germans are looking wistfully, if reluctantly, to the west. Isolation between the two opposing systems is no longer a tenable position. Germany is now confronted by the kind of choice which faced Poland between the wars. She cannot reject both alternatives without courting total destruction. Though most Germans were never good westerners and will have much difficulty in assimilating western ways of thought, they will in the end probably prefer even the Latin to the Slav, who seems to have made little progress in conquering the deep-rooted Teutonic aversion. But much depends on the attitude of the west. By what Mr. Churchill has called an act of faith and oblivion it may strengthen the hands of those in Germany, who are fighting the nationalist propaganda

of the neo-Nazis and the Communists, and who want to bring Germany into European union as a willing partner. The disposition to meet them at least a third of the way has been shown by the western powers, and was again manifest in Brussels. In a gathering consisting of representatives of all the parties to the right of Communism in all the western countries, a resolution was adopted unanimously, that "the integration of the heavy industries of western Europe is urgently required, for it is a necessary foundation of the economy of the Union as a whole. From this point of view the Ruhr Statute must not remain as an exceptional régime, but should be used as a step towards the creation of common institutions of western Europe." It can safely be said that no such resolution could have been carried at the Hague nine months ago. It measures the progress made towards burying the hatchet in Europe. Only the Germans will ever think of digging it up again, and if they find a place in Europe, perhaps not even they.

Besides the attainment of a real peace in the west there is another political motive, which is making for the unification of Europe. As recovery proceeds, the continent is beginning to regain self-confidence and self-respect. The overwhelming debt which we all owe to the United States for the European Recovery Programme is generally acknowledged. But no one relishes the dependence which it entails, nor would Americans desire that we should. Senatorial reactions to Mr. Mayhew's unhappy speech showed that there is plenty of eagerness to leave Europe to its own resources, as soon as it can safely be done. But as the O.E.E.C. has made abundantly clear, Europe can only regain her economic independence by means of further combined effort. There is no hope of each country doing it separately. That is one of the principal reasons, which is inducing people to think in European rather than in national terms. It is still an unfamiliar way of thought, but it is making headway. The idea of restoring something of the old pride and prestige of Europe, of showing that we can still stand on our own feet and teach something to the two new worlds, is running in the minds of a great many Europeans. It is the germ of a European patriotism.

Finally one or two things may be said about the practical lessons to be drawn from the experience of collective action so far acquired. The other day at Brussels M. Spaak, who now stands out as one of the great leaders of Europe, warned his hearers that, while there was no other salvation but the unity of Europe, it could not be achieved without sacrifices, sacrifices of *amour-propre* and perhaps material sacrifices as well. Some such offerings have already been made, but after the first twinge they do not seem to be hurting very much. In the military sphere no one particularly relished the new set up, nor did national jealousies and pretensions vanish with the wave of the wand.

But the habit of unity not merely of command, staffs and planning, but eventually in training, equipment and much else will grow in spite of the attendant pains. There are a number of precedents derived from the last two wars, by which the diminution of sovereignty involved can easily be justified. The same is true of the economic field, and it is perhaps natural that joint-planning comes less readily to countries which were neutral than to those who became accustomed to it as a matter of hard necessity in time of war. But the fact that the sixteen countries have submitted their national programmes to the O.E.E.C. for comparison and criticism is none the less a very radical departure. It denotes a partial surrender of freedom of action, or in other words of sovereignty, in the interest of finding a concerted solution of the economic problems of Europe. It has not been achieved without friction, which will no doubt recur from time to time, but first steps are usually the hardest, and they have been successfully taken. Here again it is not a question of the maintenance of absolute sovereignty or of its total abrogation, but of working out specific means of attaining common ends, of moving forward from one position to the next by an empirical path without too much regard for symmetry and logic. In so complex a terrain as that of Europe with all its diversities of habit and tradition there is no other sure method of progress, indeed, no other possible method.

There are plenty of dangers still ahead. No one supposes that the Russians have shot their bolt or that Mr. Vyshinski will become a convert to the merits of the Marshall Plan. Another Soviet offensive against European recovery and the consolidation of the west seems about due, but it will be met with more confidence than a year ago. Europe is not very firm on its legs yet, but it is plucking up courage and beginning to believe in a new destiny.

MIDDLE EASTERN OIL

By KENNETH WILLIAMS

THE recent increase in Middle Eastern oil production is one of the outstanding international developments of our time.

The respective figures tell their own story—for 1939 they are actual, for 1948 they are estimated. In 1939, Iran produced 9,737,000 tons ; in 1948, 25,000,000. Saudi Arabia, which in 1939 produced 539,000 tons, in 1948 produced 19,260,000 tons. Kuwait, which in 1939 produced nothing at all, in 1948 produced 6,400,000 tons, and recently has been producing at the rate of nearly a million tons monthly. Other Middle Eastern territories, though not great producers, shared in the upward tendency. Egypt, for example, which in the years before the war was producing less than a quarter of a million tons annually, last year produced 1,880,000 tons ; and latterly new sources of supply have been found near the Gulf of Suez. Bahrain, which in 1947 produced 1,300,000 tons, last year produced 1,500,000 tons. Alone of all these oil-bearing territories, indeed, Iraq showed comparatively poor figures. In 1939, she produced 4,018,000 tons, and in 1948, 3,153,000 tons. This failure was due, not to any falling-off in the productivity of Iraqi oilfields, but primarily to the position in Palestine, for, after the fighting in Palestine consequent upon the decision of the UNO Assembly to partition the country, the Iraq Government allowed no oil to flow from the Kirkuk fields to the port of Haifa, lest it should benefit the Zionists, holders of Haifa. But when new pipe-lines are completed from these fields to the Mediterranean, and if present political difficulties can be overcome, Iraq, too, will manifest a very sharp rise in production.

This astonishing rise coincides, generally, with an acute realization of the fact that European recovery depends, so far as its oil supplies for industry and agriculture are concerned, upon the Middle East. It is true that several non-Middle Eastern countries also have increased their output of oil—the world's demands upon the cessation of hostilities exceeded all forecasts—but whereas the U.S.S.R., for example, depends upon Russian oil (from the Caucasus, and from the Volga-Urals region), and the U.S.A. upon oil from the New World, Europe has to think now in terms of tankers from the Persian Gulf area, and in future of pipe-lines across the Arabian deserts to the Mediterranean.

The Marshall Plan for European Recovery predicates Middle Eastern oil. Russia saw what would be most likely to produce unsettled conditions in the Middle East, and so help to delay, or even to deny, the passage thence to Europe of oil supplies : to effect in Palestine a settlement against Arab wishes.

It is not, however, primarily of Palestine that I intend here to write. It is sufficient to point out that if the Russian hope, that the pro-Zionist settlement of the Palestine problem should result in a rapid advancement of Communism throughout the Middle East, were accurately based, then present European aspirations towards recovery might largely be doomed. What follows is written on the assumption that the Soviet diagnosis is inaccurate, and that the Arabs, appreciating—even in the depths of their disillusionment—the motives of the Russians in backing the Zionists, will be less tempted than ever before by the bait of Communism, at any rate in its aspect of Russian expansionism.

For the moment, it must be admitted, Arabs generally are faced with the necessity of making psychological adjustments ; it would be a profound error to suppose that in their future actions they will consult only what the capitalist world considers to be in their own best interests. Time will be needed to resolve the relationship of Arab with Zionist, and though it may not be possible wholly to divorce the progressive exploitation of oil from that relationship, it may be that, as the months elapse, the two problems will be seen in clearer perspective, and not merged, as in some countries they have latterly tended to be.

The flow of oil from the Middle East to the Mediterranean and western Europe is retarded by two main considerations. First, the Iraqis are not willing that oil from their Kirkuk field should go down the pipe-line to Haifa, there to be refined for the benefit, among others, of Zionists. Secondly, the Government of Syria has not yet given final permission for the pipe-lines which are contemplated from the Persian Gulf area to traverse their territory on their way to the Mediterranean. In time, however, such obstacles will be resolved or overcome by alternative methods. What will the picture be like when all the projected pipe-lines in Arabia are operating to capacity ?

It is an impressive picture. Not only will the Iraqi pipe-line now running to Tripoli and Haifa be doubled, but a 30 inch pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean also is proposed. From Iran and Kuwait, a huge pipe-line (" Middle East Pipe-lines ") will carry crude oil to the Mediterranean. And from Saudi Arabia another huge pipe-line (" Tap line "), already begun at the eastern end, will terminate in Sidon, in the Lebanon. Other pipe-lines projects are also mentioned. The coast of the Levant will, therefore, become " oil-conscious " in such a way as, on a very much smaller and less

significant scale, the coast of the Persian Gulf became, in past decades, "pearl-conscious". It will be a most radical transformation, bringing almost incalculable wealth to rulers, governments, and peoples.

Much of all this crude oil will doubtless be refined on the coast of the Levant, but much of it will go to Europe, there to be refined. Already vast plans are in operation, or are contemplated, for the construction of refineries in countries such as Britain, France, the Benelux States, Italy and Western Germany. In Britain, for example, four construction or expansion projects—at Llandarcy, Grangemouth, Stanlow and Shellhaven—are expected to increase refining capacity by some 9,500,000 tons annually; and work on the extension of the Anglo-American refinery at Fawley is expected to begin shortly.

This refining development in Britain means a revolutionary change, because of the switch-over in imports from refined products to crude petroleum. When all the present projects for refineries in Britain have been realized, it is anticipated that twenty million tons will be available annually, as compared with 2,500,000 tons in 1947. By the time that Marshall aid comes to an end, Britain, France and Italy alone, it is estimated, will have a combined "throughput capacity" of more than fifty million tons annually. The fact that almost all of this crude oil can be obtained from the Middle East does not, however, necessarily mean an end to dollar purchases for oil purposes, since for one thing much of the machinery and equipment for development and reconstruction has to be bought in the United States. But by 1952 this dollar drain will be considerably reduced.

Enough has been said to indicate that the Middle East is destined to play a part in the world's economy which few observers, say, at the beginning of this century, could have predicted. Then, land that was waterless was useless: it is not necessarily so to-day. In Kuwait, for example, which is teeming with oil, there is no fit drinking water—at least, none has so far been discovered.

What of the impact upon the Middle East itself of this sudden access of wealth? The answer to this is exercising many shrewd minds. The wealth comes to the Middle East, or at least to some of the territories in the Middle East, almost before it is ready for it, before it is ready, that is, in the sense that the social conscience of the area is scarcely developed sufficiently for the best use to be made of it. It is true that in some States, such as Iraq and Iran, development schemes containing some most encouraging and stimulating features have been laid down on the assumption of a continuing and increasing capital deriving from the oil concessionaires; but there are other lands, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, semi-patriarchal polities

in which long-term planning is a concept understood by very few, in which, indeed, the material resources other than oil are, as at present known, hardly important enough to warrant heavy expenditure on their development. King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia and Shaikh Ahmed of Kuwait have to-day monies of which but a few decades ago they could never have dreamed ; and though each ruler has done something to help the populations, the truth is that the actual wants of those populations are not as yet so insistent that they would appreciate the kind of enterprises which educated communities demand. Yet a sense of obligation is apparent. Saudi Arabia has built new roads, established new wells, has developed some agriculture as a result of the oil age ; Kuwait has built hospitals, schools, Government offices and so on. But there is, and will be, much money available when these and other initial steps have been taken.

The west should watch with interest, but also with great sympathy, the way in which the revenues going to the Middle East, through its possession of oil, are spent. It ought not to be too harsh in its judgments. After all, it took the west generations to develop a social conscience ; the "*nouveau riche*", oblivious of his obligations towards the community, did not originate in the Middle East. If, in the Middle East to-day, money derived from oil is, in the eyes of some critics, being wasted, has not money also been wasted in the west ? One must try to see this phenomenon in some perspective. In this connection, the oil companies themselves can undoubtedly help—in fact, they are already helping. Apart from maintaining the highest possible conditions in their own fields—good wages, good food and housing, medical care, schools, technical training and so on—they could, with the welcoming co-operation of local governments, assist in other fields, such as advising on irrigation, the establishment of local industries, the running of agricultural estates. But manifestly the oil concessionaires must not give the slightest suspicion of wishing to usurp the functions of local governments. That would not only be fatal to all such ideas of progress in realms other than oil in which they profess an interest it would also place in jeopardy the interests for which they are primarily in the Middle East. Advice on how Middle Eastern States should spend their revenues from oil should, and will, never be given by oil companies unless it is sought : but there should be ways in which sympathetic oilmen, possessing a complete knowledge of Middle Eastern mentality, could assist those who have come into sudden possession of vast wealth, yet who in some instances lack the knowledge of modern ways on how best to utilize it. That oilmen should be aware of the possibilities of the situation is itself an example of the distance travelled from the time when foreign concessionaires thought only

of exploiting the wealth of the country in which they operated.

It would be unwise, therefore, to criticize, without the fullest knowledge of all relevant facts, either the local administrations in the Middle East or the oil companies for the methods in which oil revenues are being spent. The trite notion that such and such a ruler or government is nothing but a prodigal spendthrift, or that such and such a company is bent on nothing but exorbitant profits is, on investigation, found to be very wide of the mark. The truth is that the relationship of oil company to ruler or government in the Middle East is a most delicate one, calling for ceaseless tact and sympathy if the utmost benefit is to be extracted from it. That word of caution does not, however, imply that the long view should not always be remembered. Some day—one cannot tell how distant it is—almost all sedentary Arabs are likely to be as educated as, say, are the Lebanese already ; some day, the principles of trade unionism will be as commonplace in Arabia as they are in Europe. It is scarcely to be anticipated that the influence of nationalism, with its readiness to suspect “ foreign exploitation ” will not be felt on the oil industry, which is destined to occupy an increasing part in the affairs of the Middle East, or, one should say, in the consciousness of the Middle East ; but an informed nationalism can be as beneficial as an ill-informed nationalism can be harmful. Obviously, therefore, both rulers or governments and oil companies have an obligation to see that maximum benefits accrue from the production of oil. It will not be easy to fulfil such an obligation. But the successful accomplishment of such a mission, based on the real collaboration of local and foreign exports, could in a few decades transform the face of the Middle East and banish for ever from it the spectres of hunger and of ignorance.

It is patently desirable that the oil-producing Middle Eastern States should not put “ all their eggs in one basket ” (and oil may yet be found in Arab lands which so far have responded adversely to drilling or have been untouched by it). Examples of over-concentration in the Middle East have in the past been provided by Egypt with its heavy reliance on cotton, and by Palestine, on citrus. To-day wider horizons are envisaged. The more broadly-based the economies of these States are, the sounder they are likely to become ; the better, too, for their prospects of political stability. Such an extension of agricultural and industrial activity does not, obviously, depend intrinsically on whether oil is discovered in any particular territory ; but for those States with already proved oil resources, the opportunities are immense and plain for all to see.

To sum up : Europe, which will depend increasingly on the Middle East for its supplies of oil, ought to look with the utmost sympathy on the regeneration of the Middle East and, if asked, should provide all possible assistance.

AMBASSADOR IN TURKEY

BY SIR HUGHE KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN

WHEN I arrived at the end of February 1939, Turkey was perhaps more taken up with internal than with international affairs. Ataturk had died in the previous November. General Ismet İnönü had succeeded him as Provisional President and was shortly to be confirmed as President of the Republic by a unanimous vote of the Grand National Assembly on April 3.

The transition was remarkable for its smoothness—a testimony to the solidity of Ataturk's work and to the support which it enjoyed in the country. The only change noticeable was the introduction of a quieter and more orthodox life in political circles. The new President naturally surrounded himself with his own friends and associates. There was a change of Prime Minister. A reaction against the exuberance of the previous régime was apparent. The long evenings in the cabaret in the basement of the Ankara Palace Hotel came to an end. Foreign representatives were spared those prolonged and copious potations, the endurance of which by my predecessors in the Ghazi's epoch had done so much to restore Anglo-Turkish relations to cordiality and confidence.

Seen from Ankara the gathering international clouds still seemed far away. Turkey nevertheless had not neglected the problem of her foreign relations. Her association with Germany, brought about in 1914 as much by German trickery as by anything else, had not survived. It had always been artificial and had it not been for the conspiracy of certain of Turkey's leading men with Berlin it would never have been realized. It had not stood the test of time, still less of defeat. German treatment of her ally during the 1914-1918 war had left lasting resentment. Some of this ill-feeling centred round my German opposite number, Herr von Papen, who had served with the Turkish forces against Allenby in Palestine, whence it is related that he departed in considerable haste.

It was a process of careful deliberation which led to the decision to return to the traditional friendship with Great Britain. The decision was Ataturk's and it is essential to realize that it was a long-term policy based entirely on an estimate of Turkey's real interests and formed before there was any certainty that the European situation was to brew into the 1939-1945 war. Against this background

the Anglo-Turkish alliance was, in Turkish eyes, a permanent factor in her international life and not primarily, as with us, an element in the international grouping necessitated by the immediate German menace.

But if Turkey's natural political orientation was towards Great Britain, there were inescapable facts which had compelled her to look to Central Europe for close commercial relations. Physical proximity alone necessitated it. By 1939 Germany had so far taken advantage of this that Turkey found herself unwillingly shackled to her former ally and in conditions which were all in Germany's favour. The economic terms which Dr. Schacht forced upon the Turks had no relation to world prices or to the ordinary laws of international trade. Before Atatürk's death it had been decided that this economic bondage to Germany was irreconcilable with political alliance with ourselves and initial steps had been taken to cast off the fetters. But this proved a long and difficult process. Much of Turkey's industrial output was German, including the railways. It would have been impossible for us at short notice to provide spare parts or even specifications for many of Turkey's needs. Nor was it easy, when the time came, to put into reverse the British preference for American tobacco—a direct consequence of the 1914 war.

But by February 1939 it was a set policy with the Turkish Government to restore the old friendship with Great Britain. Indeed I doubt whether the extent of the desire for this in Turkey was fully realized at home. Even to me, on the spot, it was sometimes surprising to find how anxious the Turkish Government were to move quickly towards the goal which they had set themselves, and how ready to deal with me in terms of the most complete frankness and confidence. Entries in my diary for that year bear this out. "I admire the Turks. They are gentlemen, straight and frank and one knows where one is with them." "It is a pleasure to be in a post where one can talk straight and frankly to people and get the same back."

Such was the background when things in Europe began to be desperately serious. I had been only a fortnight in Ankara when the Nazis marched into Czechoslovakia. This was not regarded as directly affecting Turkish interests, though it is unlikely that the Turkish Government allowed themselves to be consoled by Herr von Papen's soothing assurances delivered on his arrival a month later.

The German Ambassador arrived on April 27, 1939. His Government had for something like a year been pressing the Turks to accept him. Up to that date they had resisted and even then he was received with scant enthusiasm. In his first conversation he was at pains to declare that the German Government desired peace. They would make "the necessary settlement" in Central Europe but did not

wish to control an inch of territory. They wanted peace and nothing but peace and, at all costs, a reconciliation with France. From Turkey all they asked was on the economic side. It was typical of Turkish frankness that, immediately after Saraçoglu's first conversation with von Papen, he summoned me and gave me a long account of it. I took this down almost verbatim as he went along. When he had finished he asked if I had been writing in French or English. He had not yet made his own record. My notes were in English, but I was soon able to provide him with the French record which he required.

But by the date when von Papen's soothing words were spoken Italy was already a fortnight deep in her Albanian adventure. It was this which brought the Turks sharply up against the realities of the menace. At that time Italy was to them the principal enemy. They had not forgotten the unprovoked war of 1911. Speeches delivered more recently by Mussolini, in which he encouraged or indeed invented Italian claims to portions of Anatolia, had sunk deep. Italy was installed in the Dodecanese Islands, some of them little more than a stone's throw from Turkish soil. But all that had been bearable in comparison with the presence of Italian armies on the Balkan mainland. By this Italy became a Balkan power and a direct threat to the *status quo* in the Peninsula.

It was the Albanian affair which set in motion the negotiations between London and Ankara. The Turkish Government's reaction to our first approach affords a good illustration of what was uppermost in their mind. They represented that, if they were openly to take sides against the Axis, an immediate result would be a concentration of all opposing forces against the Straits: and they asked what effective assistance could be provided by the United Kingdom and eventually by France and Russia. "This is an indispensable element in the preparations to be made by the Turkish Government." A second consideration was that such a declaration of the Turkish attitude would have the immediate effect of stiffening Bulgarian intransigence. The Turkish Government suggested that the best contribution which they could make would be towards the maintenance of Balkan solidarity and the building up of opposition to penetration by the Axis. These negotiations produced the Anglo-Turkish Declaration of May 12, 1939, and finally the Tripartite Treaty between Great Britain, France and Turkey signed at Ankara on October 19 of the same year. Between those two dates the position had altered fundamentally. The Declaration provided that an agreement should be concluded forthwith for a reciprocal security pact: that meantime the two powers should co-operate and assist each other in the event of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean and that this agreement was aimed against no other power.

announced that consultations were in progress to ensure the speedy establishment of Balkan security and it declared that both Governments were free to consolidate peace by agreement with other countries. It was negotiated and issued under the immediate influence of the Italian threat to the Balkans—a matter directly touching Turkish interests. But when the Treaty was signed we had been six weeks at war with Germany, with Italy still neutral.

I think it is true to say that throughout this time the Turkish Government had three main considerations in mind. First and foremost, the desire to safeguard the new Turkey created by Atatürk (a consideration which governs the whole of Turkish policy), secondly, anxiety to guard against Italian encroachment in the Balkans, and thirdly a conviction that, as on the previous occasion, the Anglo-French combination was strong enough to deal with Germany on land and sea. In October, when the Treaty was signed, it would have been impossible to foresee the later developments which brought Germany to the very doors of Turkey, in Greece, Crete and North Africa, with threats of complete encirclement aggravated by further dangers owing to events in Iraq and Syria.

The German Embassy seem to have been unaware of what was passing between M. Saraçoglu and me in those early days. Whether the story was true or not that a few days before von Papen's arrival they assured Berlin that nothing was afoot I cannot say, but conditions for unostentatious negotiations were certainly favourable. The British Embassy is on the top of the hill on the south side of the town. The Foreign Minister lived some three hundred yards away. There were no houses between us. All I had to do was to take a stick and walk the distance, telling my Kavass that I did not require to be accompanied. Many of our talks took place in that way, over numerous cups of Turkish coffee in Saraçoglu's verandah. Visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the centre of the town were more conspicuous. The Embassy car, with its flag, parked outside the building could be seen from the main street. My arrival was apt to attract attention and press correspondents were constantly on the watch. I learnt on one occasion from one of my press friends that there is safety in the possession of more than one hat. He had been at great pains to discover whether another Ambassador had left his Embassy. He called there and concluded that His Excellency had indeed left because, as he told me, "his hat was not there." I inquired nervously whether my movements were traceable for a like reason, but was at once assured: "No: you have too many hats." Many of my foreign colleagues took an equally close interest in my doings. I see an entry in my diary at this time: "I avoid my colleagues just now, except X and Y—they know so much more about what I do than I do myself and it is embarrassing being told what one has

done, especially when one hasn't done it."

In any case von Papen seems to have been taken by surprise by the Declaration. It was an irony of fate that I was actually in his study returning his call when my Chancery passed on to me a telephone call from the Turkish Foreign Minister to come and see him at once to learn that the Turkish Government agreed to the terms of the Declaration.

The reactions of the German Government were milder than might have been expected. It is true that three weeks before the issue of the Declaration the Ambassador had protested to the Turks that he could not conceal the fact that the British policy of assurances and counter-assurances irritated Germany and that, if an agreement was reached, that ardent partisan of peace, Herr Hitler, would find himself in an extraordinary state of exasperation. But he assured M. Saraçoglu that Germany entirely approved the existence and strengthening of the Balkan Entente and he most forcibly deprecated the suggestion that Germany and Italy cherished any intention of proceeding further into the Balkans. He also declared that in no circumstances did Germany intend to start a war in the Mediterranean.

After the Anglo-Turkish Declaration, Herr von Papen urged the Turkish Government not to commit themselves to a definite agreement with Great Britain and pressed that, if they felt bound to do so, the agreement should at least prescribe no definition of the word "aggressor". After arguing that the British Government were definitely preparing to provoke a war, he threatened the Turks with the complete cessation of supplies from Germany. But his reaction suggested that his Government accepted what had been done and intended to concentrate on working against any closer or more specific understanding between Turkey and ourselves.

Being anxious to find out for myself exactly what von Papen intended to do, I arranged, three days after the Anglo-Turkish Declaration had been published, to attend a small ceremony at which I knew I was certain of finding him. When we met he told me he was off to Berlin at once, which was what I wanted to know. To my innocent inquiry as to the reason for his sudden departure he replied: "To report on the situation which you have created."

We met only on few occasions before the outbreak of war and, of course, never afterwards. In fact after September 3, 1939, we were never in the same room except on occasions such as the Annual Ball given by the Turkish Government on October 29, the National Day. Careful precautions were taken at the Foreign Ministry to ensure that we did not meet. If the Foreign Minister was to receive us in succession, the second was not ushered into the waiting-room until the first had left it. The door from the waiting-room to the Private Secretary's office, through which one passed into the Minister's

room was kept locked. The one of us who was first with the Minister was ushered straight down the stairs and never came back to the waiting-room. The second Ambassador was then released from confinement in the waiting-room and ushered into the Minister's presence. This worked perfectly except on one occasion when I arrived a few minutes late and narrowly avoided colliding with von Papen as I was going up the corridor to the waiting-room.

The only *contretemps* I remember occurred at one of the crowded receptions on the National Day when, in the buffet-room, Mrs. O'Donnell, the wife of my Naval Attaché, found herself anchored by a hook in her frock to the back of an unknown lady. Turning round, as far as her awkward situation admitted, she was surprised to find that her Siamese twin was Frau von Papen. I believe it took a Turkish official ten minutes to disentangle them.

Occasionally there were incidents of a less official nature. Herr von Papen was fond of shooting. One morning he went duck-shooting. Arriving at his hide he floated two decoys on the lake and withdrew to await the flight. He did not know that a member of my military staff was in another hide close by. Those tense moments of silent expectation when one listens for the sound of wings through the air were suddenly shattered by a loud report. When the splash cleared off one of the decoys was no more.

Long before his arrival in Turkey von Papen's name had become legendary. It was universally connected with all that was sharp and disreputable in diplomatic dealings. His reputation for this particular type of astuteness had been made in the 1914 war. His record as German Chancellor, as the supposed godfather of the Hitler régime and as Ambassador in Austria had further depressed his stock in world opinion. The majority reckoned him at best as an "artful dodger". My direct acquaintance with him was too short to enable me to make a profound study. The Dickensian comparison quickly suggested itself. There was something terribly professional about his charm, a virtuosity which bespoke considerable practice. Quick and clever on the surface, but I had grave doubts as to any profundity. The charm could be turned on and intensified at will—not always with the desired result in the case of the Turks. When, on the occasion of our first interview, he made a passing reference to the time when he was German Chancellor, I felt an involuntary shudder at the thought that a man with such a record should have held so responsible an office.

But I give him credit for courage. Serving a régime which can scarcely be called tolerant of insuccess, he never hesitated to face the music. His Marburg speech was an early example of this. His visit to Berlin immediately after the Anglo-Turkish Declaration was only the first of several occasions when he went to confront his Führer

with very little to say for himself. On the last occasion, after the final break-off of relations by Turkey in August 1944, I, like many others, felt certain that, if he returned to Berlin, it would be very much the worse for him. But he went—perhaps he had no alternative—and found that, like Mordecai, he was the man “whom the King delighted to honour.”

It was von Papen's delicate task to thread his way between many obstacles. As seen and known in Ankara he was definitely no Nazi, though forced like Naaman to “bow his head in the house of Rimmon.” I remember no photograph of Hitler in his rooms either in Ankara or at Therapia, though I have a distinct recollection of portraits of Wilhelm II and the Empress and of Hindenburg. I remember also that he took the earliest possible opportunity of moving from the large German Embassy into the Czechoslovak Legation, from which his staff had basely evicted the Czech Minister before his arrival. This was done to escape from close association with his Hitlerite subordinates, who were said to watch him too closely.

Nor did he hesitate to act on his own responsibility in certain matters—at least so it appeared to me. Almost from the day when war broke out, he prophesied gloomily as to the ultimate damage to German and also to British interests. By the end of 1939 members of his staff were going round urging that someone should put forward peace proposals. A month earlier he had suggested to the Turkish Foreign Minister that he should intervene, though he gave a very guarded answer to M. Saraçoglu's question whether Germany would be prepared to accept the proposals made before the outbreak of war as to Danzig and the Polish corridor. Nor was it easy to decide how far he was speaking with authority and how far on his own initiative. Although he expressed himself as certain that his proposals would receive support in Berlin, he gave no indication that he had that support for making them. It was a legitimate inference that at that time he hoped to create a position for himself as the Angel of Peace and restorer of shattered international comity.

It may have been this motive which underlay certain more definite moves which he made late in 1939 to me through a neutral friend for an early peace. Brought to a fine point—though no bones were made about it at the time—these proposals involved the removal of Herr Hitler and the installation of a less violent régime.

Suggestions on these lines were actually conveyed to me. It may have been that Herr von Papen was acting in concert with Goering and behind the back of the Führer. Whatever the truth, the communications came to an abrupt conclusion. During one of his periodic visits to Berlin von Papen seems to have been cautioned to be more discreet and not to use a cypher to which Hitler had access.

Such contacts with me were of course through a third person. After the declaration of war on September 3, 1939, I had no further touch with Herr von Papen. His last communication with me occurred three days before war broke out.

ANKARA. 31.8.39.

Der Ausserordentliche und Bevollmächtigte Botschafter des Deutschen Reiches.
DEAR SIR HUGHE,

Referring to our conversation of to-day I found out that my information about the Führer's proposition to the British Government differed greatly in tone and certain material points from the tenor and content of your official information. It was simply stated, that in reply to your Berlin Ambassador's wishes for a peaceful solution of the Polish question and an all-round English-German understanding, the Führer shared these hopes, but sees the possibility of an understanding on a large scale only after a satisfactory settlement of the Polish question.

The Führer would be ready to a "close collaboration" with your country, being understood that our relations with Russia and Italy will remain untouched and the colonial position settled.

As you will see, this information about the German offer is bare of any aggressiveness and gives us—this is my personal conviction—every opportunity of arranging in a definite form all pending questions.

Let's hope so ! I am sorry to hear by radio this moment that the British Navy and the Territorial army have been mobilised. Does this mean war ?

Believe me, dear Sir Hughe, with kind regards,

Yours very sincerely,
Sgd. FRANZ PAPEN.

A month after its publication the Anglo-Turkish Declaration became tripartite, France joining with us as soon as the negotiations for the return of the Hatay to Turkey were completed. The Declaration prescribed, among other points, two special tasks—the conclusion of a long-term security Pact and consultation to ensure the speedy establishment of Balkan security.

The first of these goals was successfully reached when the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Alliance was signed on October 19, 1939. The second was a conspicuous failure.

(The author was British Ambassador to Turkey from 1939 to 1944. This article is the last of three extracts from his book "Diplomat in Peace and War" which John Murray will be publishing later this year. The first and second extracts, "An Ambassador's Childhood" and "Reflections on the Middle East", appeared in the February and March issues of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

AUSTRALIA FACES THE FUTURE

By W. FRIEDMANN

OUTWARDLY, Australia in 1949 shows all the signs of a contented and care-free country. Although it lacks the beauty, variety and natural resources of Europe and America, a population of less than eight million can lead a satisfactory and comfortable life on the fringe of the continent which has been developed. Australia produces all essential foods, and is a major exporter of some, and this self-sufficiency eliminates one of the greatest anxieties of present-day Britain. Industrial raw materials are less abundant, but there is enough coal, steel and some other metals for ample development of secondary industries.* Industrial development is retarded less by lack of raw materials than by man-made causes, mainly labour shortage and the restrictive practices of some key unions, in particular the coal miners.

Many other factors contribute to this picture of contentment and prosperity. Like the United States and Canada, Australia made a very strong contribution to the armed forces of the Allies in the last war. But like these other two States, the country itself has not suffered from war, either physically or economically. On the contrary, her secondary industries have received a tremendous stimulus from the needs of wartime production. Thanks to the American navy the menace of Japanese invasion was dispersed in 1942, after only a short scare. With the destruction of Japan's military might, Australia is fairly safe from immediate threats to her security. The post-war scarcity of food and raw materials has also favoured Australia. Her main exports and sources of wealth are still wheat and wool, which in a seller's market are fetching prices undreamed of even a few years ago. In a country which, in relation to its age and population, has perhaps the most closely knit labour organization in the world, this prosperity, coupled with an acute labour shortage, has also led to short hours and high wages. The Commonwealth Arbitration Court, which has a mixture of legislative and arbitral functions, has sanctioned a 40-hour week throughout Australia, and leisure time is further increased by a profusion of public holidays sprinkled throughout the year. Wage rates are particularly favourable to the unskilled worker. A railway porter at the age of 19 earns a minimum of £7 10s. 0d. a week. Social

*Some production figures were given in "Australian Prospects and Problems" by W. Friedmann. The Fortnightly, April, 1948.

insurance though lagging behind present-day Britain, is far advanced, and the present Labour Government is developing it further.

Three main dangers threaten the balance and peaceful development of Australia. But it is essential first to disperse an illusion entertained by almost every European about Australia. It is the illusion of a "young" country, of a continent opening up great and almost unlimited prospects to the adventurous pioneer who wishes to escape from the anxieties of present-day Europe and the austerity of a strictly governed and disciplined Britain. Australia is a young State only in years. In little more than a century, she has grown to her present state of agricultural and industrial production, and developed high standards of government and social security. But it is quite wrong to compare modern Australia, for example, with the United States of a century ago. The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1900; it took over from Britain most of her mature industrial, social and political institutions developed over centuries; from the United States it imported the foundations of her federal constitution. This imposition of a highly developed governmental and administrative machinery of industrial organization, and social groupings, upon a country which had only recently emerged from a state of almost complete primitiveness and desolation is the most striking feature of modern Australia. It has produced a premature solidification and rigidity of the social and political pattern of the country. There is far more social experimenting in present-day Britain than in Australia. A rigidly controlled trade unionism, a fanatically strict White Australia policy, a multiplication of government through the Commonwealth and six member States, in a country of under eight millions, make Australia one of the most governed countries of the modern world. The huge sheep and cattle stations of the "Bush" come closer to the picture of a pioneering country with vast open spaces. But the great majority of Australians live in the six principal cities. Australia's problems cannot be understood unless this basic fact is appreciated: the imposition of the standards of mature and highly developed countries upon a young and relatively immature State.

Recent events have underlined three main danger spots in Australia's future. The first is the strain of a federal system of government in a country which has, like the rest of the world, to adapt itself to rapidly changing social and economic conditions. The second is the social tension which constantly threatens to disrupt both industrial progress and social peace in a country in which both employers and workers are highly organized, but which cannot go back to the unrestricted capitalism of the nineteenth century, while constitutional restrictions hamper the development of democratic socialism comparable to that of modern Britain. Last but not less important, such events as the

emancipation of India and Burma, the troubles in Malaya, the revolt in Indonesia, the communist victories in China and the threat of an American withdrawal from Japan and other areas of the Pacific starkly expose the artificiality of Australia's sense of security.

A federal system of government appears as the obvious solution for groups of States which are driven by military and economic necessities and other unifying factors to combine, but have too strong a national tradition to abandon their identity completely. But champions of European federalism should study closely the problems of such federations as Australia, where generally racial unity and other factors create exceptionally favourable conditions for a successful federation. The bank nationalization case, which is shortly to be decided by the Privy Council in London, illustrates the main problem of a modern federation. The issue in this case is whether the Australian Federal Constitution—which contains an enumeration of federal legislative powers, and a clause guaranteeing absolute freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse among the States—prevents the Commonwealth from nationalizing the banking system. The Commonwealth has undoubted power to legislate on banking, but the problem is whether this power must stop short of direct or indirect interference with the freedom of inter-States commerce, and whether this freedom is to be interpreted as a legal guarantee of private enterprise.

A balance of powers between Commonwealth and States which appeared reasonable in the 1890's is no longer reasonable in 1949. The social service State, the needs of modern defence, the control of vital commodities and the safeguarding of a minimum standard of living, impose duties on a modern government which constitutions framed in the nineteenth century are unable to meet except by a very elastic interpretation. Too dynamic an interpretation would, however, undermine judicial independence and the separation of powers.

Probably more important for the life of the average Australian than bank nationalization is price control. During the war the Commonwealth, under its defence power, established a very efficient system of price control, but permanent powers of federal price control could only be obtained by an amendment of the Constitution, and a referendum was held. As it coincided with a wave of re-action against wartime controls and an anti-Labour tide, it was rejected, yet at a time when, in Australia as elsewhere, too much money chases too few goods, such control is as necessary as ever. With the defeat of the referendum, the power of price control passed to six States, of very different political complexion, and efficiency, and almost invariably at loggerheads with each other or with the Commonwealth. The result is a growing danger of rising prices and inflation. In a less prosperous and secure country, like Britain, such

constitutional conflicts would be ruinous. Nor has the federal system proved quite such a unifying factor as many theorists would expect. Fully fledged machineries of government, in six different States as well as the Commonwealth, create a host of vested interests in particularism. For a country which aims at rapid industrial expansion, federalism acts as a severe brake.

During 1948 a series of strikes, usually for periods of many weeks, temporarily paralysed such vital industries as coal-mining in New South Wales—which supplies most of Australia—gas and bread-baking in Melbourne, railways and tramways in Victoria and Queensland, not to speak of numerous smaller disputes. Behind these acute outbursts of industrial unrest, there lie more fundamental problems. The world-wide antagonism between moderate Labour and Communism is acute in the Australian trade union movement. The proportion of "militant" unions is relatively great in Australia. They are particularly strong in coal-mining and transport, and in certain engineering industries. Increasingly the conflict between militants and moderates in the Labour movement cuts across the older conflict between labour and management, and the joint interest of all trade unionists to maintain high standards of wages, a "bigger slice of the cake", regardless of the effect on industrial production. Owing to Australia's relative remoteness from the storm centres of world politics, and its present high economic prosperity, the need for a more active part in the national production drive has hardly yet affected the trade union movement, although the Commonwealth Labour Government is increasingly concerned about it. The British trade union movement, in a country threatened with economic ruin and governed by Labour, has had to face this problem earlier and is well on the way towards accepting its new and heavy burden of responsibility for the economic welfare of the nation rather than the mere protection of group interests.

In Australia the psychological situation is very different. Moreover, the federal system stands in the way of any substantial socialization of industry. Organized Labour therefore remains more acutely conscious of the class conflict, and this is underlined by the attitude of the majority of employers much more reactionary than that of modern British industrialists. Australia established one of the earliest and most comprehensive systems of industrial conciliation and arbitration, which has been frequently revised. A number of Commonwealth Conciliation Commissioners first deal with any industrial dispute. If conciliation fails, the matter goes to the Commonwealth Arbitration Court which can make an award with effect for the whole Commonwealth. But the arbitration court is not a fully fledged law court. Its judgments cannot be directly enforced. Its main sanction is the de-registration of employers or

labour associations, so that they lose their federal standing. But this is often insufficient to prevent strikes which have recently been far more due to politics than to industrial grievances. If the conflict between Soviet Russia and the western democracies sharpens, political strikes, mainly inspired by communist unions, and odious counter-measures, such as Essential Services Acts, are likely to recur more often. An economic slump may become another cause of increased social tension. The present wheat and wool boom may end before long, and then the choice will be clearly between a more fully controlled and planned economy of full employment, by public works and other measures of government, and a repetition of the "free enterprise" depression of the early 'thirties, the memory of which haunts the Australian, as it does the British, Labour movement.

At present both the constitutional and the social problems of Australia may seem small by comparison with the troubles of Britain and the countries of Europe. In a sense this is also true of Australia's international problems. The immediate dangers facing Europe still outweigh by far those facing the British Dominions in the Pacific. But the problems which, over the next few generations, face a small continent whose population can hardly rise above ten millions during the next decade, are of terrifying magnitude and adequate counter measures are far more difficult to conceive than in the case of the western hemisphere. Except for two American naval victories in 1942, Japan would most likely have occupied Australia. Japan herself might not become a menace again for another ten or twenty years. But much nearer home, the troubles in Malaya and Indonesia and the communist advance in China, pose new and immense problems. For many decades Australia has maintained a rigid "White Australia" policy, of which the present Labour Minister for Immigration, Mr. Calwell, is a most fanatical exponent. Non-British Europeans, especially displaced persons, are now being brought into Australia roughly at the rate of two British immigrants to one non-British. But the prohibition against coloured immigrants remains absolute. What is more, the government is remorselessly expelling such persons as Malayan husbands of Australian women, despite war service and productive employment in Australia, or an Indonesian woman, with all her children, who was admitted on a limited permit but had since married an Australian. Even at the cost of offending the rising nationalist sentiment of the peoples of the Pacific and the Far East, Australia will neither make exceptions nor hear of a quota system of immigration.

On the other hand, its foreign policy, guided by the energetic Dr. Evatt, has recently even risked conflict with Britain, let alone with other European nations, in order to demonstrate its sympathy with the nationalist movements of Asia. The most significant expression

of this policy has been the recent full participation by Australia in the New Delhi Conference of Asian nations under the chairmanship of Pandit Nehru, which passed a number of resolutions, in protest against Dutch actions in Indonesia.

It is not easy to reconcile these two policies : a policy of strict discrimination against coloured persons in Australia, and an ardent championship of anti-European movements in the Pacific area. A cynic might find the explanation in the conflicting policies and personalities of the Ministers concerned. But the causes go deeper than that. The majority of Australians, in particular the organized Labour movement, support the White Australia policy not so much for racial reasons—although the element of racial superiority is by no means absent—but in order to protect the high economic and social standards of Australians, which an influx of cheap Chinese, Malayan or Indonesian labour would certainly undermine. Moreover, even a very liberal immigration policy would not begin to solve the problem of over-population in the Far East, which must be reckoned in terms of tens of millions, not of thousands. A considerable section of public opinion—rightly, as I believe—supports the quota system of immigration, not so much because it would solve the problem of over-population but because it would conciliate the national susceptibilities of the peoples of the South West Pacific and Asia, without undermining the social and economic structure of Australia. The policy of the present Government, strongly backed by the trade union movement, is, however, to counter this nationalist resentment by supporting indigenous nationalist movements everywhere outside Australia. Hence the participation of Australia in the New Delhi Conference, at the risk of increasingly strained relations with the Dutch and possibly other European nations. So far Australia has achieved remarkably friendly relations both with the new India and the Indonesian republicans, but these gains would quickly be outweighed by a communist advance in the South-West Pacific which would regard any non-communist and white Australia with open hostility.

Even more immediate strategic dangers would confront Australia if the diminishing protection of the British Navy were no longer counter-balanced by that of the United States. Hence the deep anxiety with which rumours of any American withdrawal from the Pacific area are received in Australia. Such a move would suddenly tear away the cushion of security and expose Australia as a small island of transplanted British surrounded by an ocean of hundreds of millions of hungry Asians, at present disorganized, but liable to break out and overwhelm Australia under the guidance of a fanatical, disciplined and presumably communist-directed minority.

DEVELOPING THE COLONIES : II

BY GEOFFREY NUNN

THE previous article* traced the history of the growth of the idea underlying the policy now known familiarly as "Colonial Development and Welfare" and of the legislative acts which have been passed to carry idea and policy into effect. The present article poses and attempts to answer the question: "What is planning?"

When the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Estimates stated, in criticizing the Ten Year Plan of Development for Nigeria, that "this is not planning" it did not do more than hint as to what, in its view, planning really is. It is true that the committee made certain recommendations, but it is equally true that these recommendations do not in fact reach to the roots of the problem, for they are concerned with such matters, and of course important ones, as adequacy of European staff, the adequacy of the pay of that staff and the association of colonial opinion with the preparation of development plans.

The Select Committee's Report has called forth a counterblast from the Colonial Office which, apart from being altogether too long and therefore creating the impression of over-arguing a somewhat flimsy brief, also fails to reach the roots of the problem. The Select Committee's Report and the Colonial Office's reply are on record and can be obtained by those who are interested in the problem. Both however plead specialist cases for a specialized public.

It should be said at the outset that planning in the colonial context is not an exercise which can (or ought to be expected to) produce early results. It is, therefore, the more surprising to find the following sentence in the Select Committee's Report: "The point of the criticism is that if the Ten Year Plan were carried out over-night the improvement in the condition of the masses of Nigerians would be barely perceptible." That sentence alone vitiates the complete Report. It is almost a perfect example of the muddled thinking which has for so long bedevilled Colonial planning. According to this line of thought a plan is not a plan which, if carried out over-night, would not improve the condition of the masses of the people for whom the plan is drawn. Presumably, therefore, the only thing which deserves the name of a plan is something which, if carried out

*"Developing the Colonies : I" by Geoffrey Nunn. March 1949.

over-night, would have this happy result ! This idea of quick and spectacular results is the one pitfall that every Secretary of Development of every colony has had to avoid digging for himself and which every colonial population has dug in the middle of his path for him.

The truth is, of course, that planning in the colonial context is an entirely different operation from planning in that of the United Kingdom or of western union. The reason for this is that the United Kingdom Government has unavoidably to pursue two separate types of development simultaneously : physical-economic and constitutional. It is impossible for the British Government to guide economic development without taking into account its commitments on the constitutional side. In other words, however desirable it may be to tie the economies of individual colonial areas or colonies to the economy of Great Britain, it is impossible for this to be done so long as planning in the Colonies has to be carried out by democratic means. So long as—and may it continue for ever !—the colonial peoples themselves are to carry the ultimate weight in planning the economic reconstruction of their own countries, so long will the European civil servants which form a part of the administrative and legislative machine of those countries be unable to exert more than a certain degree of influence on the course of events and so long will the demand for immediate improvement of existing conditions obscure the ultimate aims of long term economic development.

It cannot be too frequently stressed that planning in the colonies is a question of producing a plan acceptable to local public opinion. In order to be so acceptable it must set out to improve existing conditions urgently and it must therefore start from the point on the road which each colony has reached at the moment when planning starts.

The conditions in most colonial territories which any plan of development must be designed to improve are made up of inadequate and over-crowded housing, malnutrition, insufficient and over-crowded schools and hospitals, universal under-employment, lack of family organization and cohesion, a peasant agriculture which is inefficient compared with modern standards, a lack of "community" amenities such as youth clubs, and an undesirably wide divergence between standards of living of the richest and poorest classes. Such conditions may be said to be almost universal throughout the colonial empire. In some areas and in some individual colonies there is also an insistent hunger for land.

Practically throughout the colonial empire prosperity, and particularly that of the working classes, depends upon a healthy agriculture. This is not to say that partial industrialization is not important or desirable in most colonies. Indeed every plan ought to provide for the fostering at least of secondary industries. Nevertheless, any programme of colonial industrialization which is likely

to be generally feasible in the immediate future will only detract from the essentially agricultural background of the colony in question, or from the essentially agricultural leanings, abilities and preferences of most of its inhabitants.

The essence of the problem of planning is the production of increased wealth—the raising of the earning power of the people and thereby of their standards of living. A colony expects to move towards full employment in so far as these are obtained and the people must look to improved education, with the emphasis on the healthy and prosperous family as the foundation of a healthy and prosperous society. Healthy family life depends upon stability. Stability in a primarily agricultural community rests on the individual small holder and, moreover, on increased productivity. Substantially increased productivity requires substantially improved health and surroundings and these require money, in other words, more revenue. More revenue can only come from increased productivity—and so the circle closes. Unfortunately, present conditions in most colonial territories are such that their Governments are obliged to try to break into this circle at many points simultaneously instead of only at one.

If there were no pressing social problems colonial Governments could draw plans in an entirely different way. Not long ago the Development Commission for Southern Rhodesia produced an outline for long term development in that country. It was the sort of plan of which many secretaries for development in individual colonies have been dreaming, but which they have been prevented from designing for their own territories solely by the fact that public opinion would not have found it acceptable. Thus, the Southern Rhodesia plan deals with the broader and long-term aspects of development and sets out schemes for improving water supplies, transportation and the provision of electric power. It lays fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Southern Rhodesia Government the responsibility for making available the essentials without which no development can ultimately be a success, but no such plan could have been drawn up in any place whose attitude towards the African is not that of Southern Rhodesia.

Another type of plan altogether is also imaginable. All planning should in some way or other lay foundations for further development and the basic requirements for a healthier, wealthier and wiser country, are nutrition, extended education and public health (including housing). Adequate nutrition depends on a healthy agriculture. A healthy agriculture depends on soil fertility, modernized methods of farming and stable local and overseas markets and prices. Stable markets and prices depend largely on the development of co-operatives and adequate transportation.

As for education, no country with a population which is rapidly

increasing (as is the population of practically every colonial territory) can look forward to providing universal compulsory primary education within a period of ten years. Nevertheless, universal compulsory education ought to be each colony's long term aim. The plan should therefore provide first for the training of teachers and then for more schools. Since, however, the future development of any colony must depend largely on an adequate supply of technicians, an improvement in technical education must play a prominent part.

Then turning to public health, the housing requirements and improvement of every colony require no emphasis. But what of other health services? There are two possibilities, either to increase the number of beds per thousand of the population available in the public hospitals to a reasonable number in the period of the plan, or to attempt to take medical attention closer to the people by such methods as the provision of village dispensaries, an organized midwifery service and a school medical and dental service. In other words, the choice is between spending the medical portion of development funds mainly on bricks and mortar or on personnel and services. No colony can do both.

The second alternative type of plan begins now to take shape. A summary of it would look something like this :—

(a) NUTRITION

(a) *Agricultural aspects :*

- Soil fertility.
- Anti-erosion measures and rehabilitation of derelict areas.
- Mixed farming.
- Land Settlement.
- Experiments in new forms of tenure.
- Water supplies (for cattle and irrigation).

(b) *Marketing aspects :*

- Co-operatives (including 4-H clubs).
- Transport (including roads, railways, airports and harbours).
- Guaranteed prices.

(b) EDUCATION

- Teachers' training.
- School buildings.
- Technical education.

(c) HEALTH

- Housing.
- Health Services.
- Hospitals.

But even a plan such as this will fail unless certain things are done by the United Kingdom Government which cannot be done by colonial Governments. So far as the United Kingdom Government is concerned the first essential step is a concerted attack on what may be called the primary products front. This means that by international agreements, by pooling arrangements and so on, fluctuations in the prices of colonial primary products must be ironed out, for it is

only by this process that similarly violent fluctuations in the prosperity and the levels of employment in the colonies can be prevented. It is impossible to stress adequately the importance which colonial peoples themselves attach to this last point. Officials and unofficials, governors and governed, black and white, have been for years attempting to explain to the Home Government that not only reconstruction but mere stability depend upon a steady guaranteed market for the primary producer in the colonies. The point can perhaps be best illustrated by the incident of the leading German Nazi propagandist in the Gold Coast who was interned in 1939. This man had been for some years collecting funds for Hitler's Winter Help and had a large sum in his possession which it would have been impossible for him to have sent out of the country. He decided, therefore, to distribute it before he was interned, and just before the war started he handed sums of money to selected Africans and instructed them to disperse into the various provinces and districts of the Gold Coast and inform the people that Hitler was going to war with Great Britain and that it would be to the advantage of every Gold Coast native for Hitler to win as the African would then receive a fair price for his cocoa. With the usual German efficiency in such matters he had placed his finger on the one permanently sore point in the relations between the Gold Coast African and his Government and it took the governmental propaganda machine years to catch up with that story—if indeed, it ever fully caught up with it.

To be just, the present Government of Great Britain has, in recent months, made it a part of their policy to ensure to colonial primary producers a steady market. This is an immense step forward and has been welcomed in all parts of the colonies. It would, however, have been welcomed far more joyously if the British Government had found it possible to depart from the usual practice of hedging round its statement with so many cautious conditional and other subordinate clauses as to make the true intention of the announcement itself almost undiscoverable.

To sum up : all criticisms of colonial plans fail which do not set out an alternative method of approach. The method of approach suggested by the Select Committee is in every way inadequate. This is due to the one reason that the Committee has entirely failed to appreciate that planning in the colonies is—in the eyes of the people whose lives are being planned—essentially a matter of improving the present conditions as rapidly as possible. Alternative methods of planning are possible and two have been suggested in this article. One of these—what may be called the basic planning of fundamental mechanics—is only possible where it is not necessary to pay too meticulous attention to the view of the majority. The day for such planning, in most colonies, is passed. This is not to say that these

Fundamental mechanics should not be properly planned now ; it is to say, however, that they cannot be planned in isolation. Finally, a new approach to planning is possible which combines both the improvement of present conditions and the laying of foundations for long term reconstruction, provided that the principal emphasis is thrown on to agriculture and that the British Government will turn its attention to that fluctuation of prices of primary colonial agricultural products which is the obstacle to all planning.

SLEEPLESSNESS

BY D. FOLLIOT

Clear is the night and luminous the moon.
 The ceiling, streaked with gold,
 Is a plain the eye must travel
 On an aimless journey in the silence,
 With no landmark, no signpost and no home.
 A distant barking, like an owl's cry,
 The restless trees, a passing footstep,
 Tell the distorted hours.

Clear is the night and brilliant the stars.
 Deep shadows curl and spring—
 Tenebrous whips that spur the breath,
 Drive the blood onwards, knot the panic threads
 That strangle even prayer.
 My mind shivers and colours like a web
 Hung between the fragile flames at dawn.
 Drowning in darkness, I have seen the future
 Unroll to the scream of a passing train,
 And sleep, a hawk that will not strike,
 Avoids my shrinking eyes.

Clear is the night, the moon is calm and clear.
 When comes the swift relief—
 Like the drugged rest after pain—
 To all the aching weakness in the breast
 Glib tongues call virtues ?
 My dreams defeat me. As I turn my head
 Night lays its armour on the frightened grass.

UNESCO IN PERSPECTIVE

BY KENNETH LINDSAY, M.P.

FAR too little attention has so far been paid to the specialized agencies of the United Nations, each one an experiment in international organization, concerned as they are with education, health, food, labour, refugees, banking and civil aviation. The first four have comparable structures, though with interesting differences. Each has a secretariat, a director-general, some sort of executive board and an assembly. The member-States which compose them are not coterminous with UNO itself, nor with each other. Their budgets differ in size, but the principle of proportionate payment according to population is common form. They are not yet the subject of popular enthusiasm and seldom of constructive criticism. The device of His Majesty's Opposition has no place in their constitution. Each specialized agency derives its authority from its own independent charter ; each is an inter-governmental institution with autonomous administration ; in effect separate " treaties " are made between the organizations and the Economic and Social Council. Although they lead separate lives, their director-generals now have regular meetings, summoned by the secretary-general of UNO himself. There is an obvious need for integration of programmes at the highest level, for reasons both of policy and finance : there is also need for co-ordinating and harmonizing policy formulation at the national level. Steps have been taken to obtain this co-ordination. For example Sir Ronald Adam, Chairman of the British Council, has been a delegate to all the UNESCO conferences : but more needs to be done.

In the case of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization the annual conference is the ultimate authority ; it appoints the director-general, determines the budget and general policy. The executive board is responsible together with the director-general for the broad supervision of the programme between sessions of the conference and the director-general and his staff are of course responsible for the actual conduct of the whole organization. It will be clear that much depends on the personality of the director-general and a harmonious relationship with the executive board. The first director-general was appointed for two years only, with his wings clipped. The constant preparation of material for conferences

(three have already been held) ; further preparation for executive boards (fourteen have been held) ; the separation of administration from programme ; the differing conceptions of administrative control ; the difficulty of choosing first-class personnel with some relation to geographical origin and competence (they do not always coincide)—all these matters have complicated and endangered the progress of UNESCO. We must take our share of blame for these mistakes and I have reason to think that rectification is well in hand. The new director-general, Dr. Torres-Bodet, has been instructed critically to examine the organization, to concentrate more responsibility on those responsible for programmes, to effect economies and to make plain the respective rôles of other specialized agencies, international non-governmental organizations, national commissions and other bodies in implementing various parts of the programme. I have dwelt on these mundane matters, because we are still comparatively illiterate in the techniques of making international organizations come alive.

Dr. Torres Bodet, scholar and statesman, combines in his experience some of the essential qualities for this important task. As a Minister—he has been Minister of Education and Foreign Affairs in Mexico—he is used to making decisions, seizing on priorities and determining relevance. Already he has taken hold of a too-ambitious programme and decided to concentrate on matters which can bear fruit, without losing sight of the more profound questions affecting national cultures and the supreme moral crisis of our age. His inaugural address and other speeches to the French and Belgian national commissions show him to be a humanist, with a devout conviction in the unity of knowledge and of mankind combined with a rare understanding of the necessity for a wide appeal to the masses. As a poet and scholar he is only too conscious of the need for enlisting the best from all national cultures in building the temple of peace.

Why was UNESCO born ? Apart from its immediate origin in the meetings of Allied Ministers of Education, there is a longer history which goes back at least to Comenius, the great Czech educator 300 years ago, to Marc-Antoine Jullien 140 years ago and more recently to the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. Between the wars our own Board of Education sanctioned and encouraged the teaching of the League of Nations in the schools. At Columbia University under the inspiration of Professor Kandel and at the Institute of Education under the leadership of Sir Fred Clarke, great stimulus was given to the subject of comparative education. Some attempts, notably among the Scandinavians but also between French and German teachers, were made to eliminate undesirable material in text-books. In science particularly, but also in other fields, increased international contacts were being made all over the world.

More and more attention was given to student and post-graduate fellowships between the various countries.

But meanwhile a contrary movement was gathering force, which used or prostituted education and culture as an instrument of national policy. To some extent all countries, possessing a national system of education and an official cultural agency, are guilty of sharing in this movement. The French have long experience in making known their culture; fortunately its glory lay in its critical spirit, its humanism and its immortal language. The British Council has displayed a studied tolerance in emphasizing the practice of a two-way traffic, bringing together on many occasions students and teachers of many nations. It was always my hope that the British Council should be more an overseas extension of the Ministry of Education and less an educational extension of the Foreign Office. That emphasis has obtained. The Americans have for long spent millions of dollars on educational work all over the world. The new policy invented by Goebbels and imitated by other countries went much further. This was to secure complete control of schools, youth movements, universities, press, radio, and all forms of mass media and then to inoculate a whole nation with racial myths and deluge the outside world with propaganda. This technique is still being practised; it is no accident that the question of church schools has rocked four cabinets in contemporary Europe. When the last war ended the world was faced with several governments spending large sums of money "putting across" their way of life. It was largely due to this new phenomenon, affecting not only education, but science, culture and mass media that UNESCO became a more comprehensive organization, challenging the darker forces along the whole front, asserting the claims of education, science and culture in the peace structure of the United Nations.

After the war, the world was faced with vast areas of destruction, affecting both the physical and the psychological life of countless countries. Each country—victor, vanquished and neutral alike—was faced with a moral crisis; perhaps occupied countries presented (and still do) special problems. The millions of orphaned, maladjusted and handicapped children; the wave of juvenile delinquency, the loss of education and family life; the shortage of books, scientific apparatus, desks, pencils and paper; the mutilation of university life and above all the loss of values and sense of social responsibility—what a problem and what a challenge! There was thus superimposed on the intrinsic problems of educational reform a further problem of sheer reconstruction. These problems, however we may conceal them or evade them, remain to-day. The subterranean fires may break out again unless there is a deliberate and constant policy to preach and teach through every known method,

employing all the media which science has placed at our disposal, the gospel of tolerance, freedom of thought and world unity. Dr. Torres Bodet said at Beirut :

In Mexico, I have been the Minister of Education and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In these two posts, I came to realize that there could be no strict dividing line between the duties of the educationalist and the diplomat's obligations. If teachers train the new generations to be intolerant in their exclusive nationalism, diplomats will be compelled to carry on an aggressive or revengeful policy. In their conduct of international affairs people show themselves to be no other than they are in their school classrooms, in their books, on their stages or in their laboratories.

In its starkness this quotation may over-simplify the problem, but it provides the key to understanding the long-term objectives of UNESCO's policy.

To fit the programme into the general policy it is proposed, first, to carry out all that part labelled "reconstruction". This entails considerable co-operation with outside bodies, national commissions and other specialized agencies. UNESCO cannot itself become a vast relief agency, but it can make known needs and canalize assistance of all kinds especially if voluntary and governmental help is forthcoming. This is being done. But even now fresh demands are made ; there are 200,000 children among the refugees from the Middle East and an increasing number of "intellectuals" among European refugees. It is difficult to foresee the end of these labours except to say that a sustained effort will be needed for many years. It is also true that every part of UNESCO's activities is linked inevitably with some phase of reconstruction.

The second main division of the field is education itself. Under the experienced leadership of Dr. Beeby, chief education officer of New Zealand, UNESCO is beginning to act as a clearing house, collecting, analysing and distributing information. At the invitation of four governments educational missions are going to the Philippines, Siam, Afghanistan and Syria to advise on precise matters of organization and policy. It is a fact familiar to educationalists that standards the world over are very unequal ; ideas travel much more slowly than say the results of scientific research. There is thus a vast job of raising standards from the nursery school to the University. After two years agitation a group of people interested in the early years of childhood education have secured a modest grant of 5,000 dollars to found a world council. Our object is to concentrate public attention on the practical needs of young children and to share experience in meeting those needs. We propose to hold a conference in London this August. UNESCO itself is sponsoring in co-operation with the Danish Government a conference on adult education. Last year at Utrecht a similar conference was held on universities and a continuing commission is discussing the establish-

ment of a permanent international bureau. A small grant has been made to the International Association of Professors and Lecturers to make a study of the question of equivalence of degrees. In the matter of text-books Professor Quillen of California, after a year of careful work, is now completing the formulation of objective criteria and general advice to stimulate and help responsible authorities in each country to undertake on their own account a revision of school books. To use a phrase of Dr. Torres Bodet, "when I say revision I am speaking of a juster presentation of humanity's profound solidarity both in time and space." In the approach to mass education UNESCO will revise its methods, acting as a base for the many experiments now being undertaken rather than attempting a series of pilot projects itself. One interesting exception is Haiti, where in conjunction with the food and agriculture and world health organizations, a valuable experiment is being made which has stirred the enthusiasm of local inhabitants.

Perhaps these examples are enough to illustrate three methods of working, which affect other divisions than education and particularly science : first, the 'clearing house' approach : secondly, the value of careful assistance to bona-fide international organizations ; thirdly, the direct sponsorship of conferences to stimulate interest and bring together different kinds of experience and thus give a lead on the question of standards.

The third main division is natural science, a field in which international co-operation was further ahead even before UNESCO. But since 1947 four regional offices at Cairo, Shanghai, Delhi and Montevideo, have been established. Their functions vary with each region, but they include contact with government services, scientific societies and individual scientists, technical advice, co-ordination of research and the mutual communication of results obtained, information about equipment, census of needs, surveys and so forth. The Delhi office is studying the possibilities of manufacturing rubber and penicillin for scientific and social purposes : the Montevideo office has spent most of its time setting up the International Institute for the Hylean Amazon. Much help has been given to a variety of international scientific bodies making possible their annual conferences and enabling individual scientists to attend them. This month, in co-operation with the world health organization, a permanent council is to be formed for the co-ordination of international congresses on medical science. I am assured that this network of scientific liaison is valued by scientists the world over.

With regard to social science and philosophy the problems are more complex and the collaboration of specialists is of more recent date. But economists, sociologists and specialists in political science and comparative law are being brought together with the

aid of UNESCO. It is too early to speak of results. I hear of volumes in preparation, one on aggressive nationalism, and a series of monographs on 'Ways of Life' from eight countries. Last month there was also set up an international council of philosophy and humanistic sciences.

In the sixth division, relating to the arts and cultural activities, there are a number of useful practical tasks which an international body like UNESCO can undertake more easily than any one country. They include international catalogues; reproduction of works of art, translation of books for Arab and Latin American countries—publication of occasional journals such as *Museum* and survey of library services; the book token scheme to enable buyers in soft currency countries to pay in their own currency for orders placed with book-sellers in hard currency countries; examination of the problem of copyright leading to a universal convention; the establishment of a cultural liaison office in the Middle East—these tasks if selected with discrimination can be carried through without undue cost and with advantage to many scholars and professional workers.

The last main division of UNESCO activities concerns the mass media, press, film and radio. Apart from the physical problem of shortages which have been surveyed in two volumes, the main problem of mass media is not one of principle. These are modern techniques of immense power and importance, but nevertheless techniques. How to use them is the question, how to make them subserve the ideals for which UNESCO stands. Much discussion has taken place and many paper wars have been waged on behalf of different plans and policies. In the long run a country gets the press, the films and the radio it deserves. UNESCO can suggest, but can never impose. It is at this point that I turn to the work of national commissions.

In the case of UNESCO the cart came before the horse. Not so with the International Labour Organization where in most countries employer and employee organizations existed first. Owing to the comprehensive nature of UNESCO's activities—I have mentioned seven main divisions—national commissions tend to be large and unwieldy bodies. Yet it is obvious that UNESCO is always in danger of becoming an air-borne bureaucracy unless it has roots deep in the various member-States. People must see the intimate relation between their own efforts, whether as teachers or scientists, and the wider community of nations, if UNESCO is to matter; they must have confidence in the seriousness of purpose animating the whole organization. What Dr. Torres Bodet calls "the sin of frivolity" must be excommunicated. "The people call for practical tangible results and it is our duty to supply them," he told the French National Commission. In another passage he said:

The National Commissions, it is true, make up for certain constitutional restrictions upon our organization, but have we made sure that in all countries the national commissions are able to operate on the scale which the problems of our time require ? This is a very delicate task. UNESCO has no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of governments. We have neither the power nor the wish to transform the organization into a world Ministry of Education. Nor do we wish to burden the impoverished countries still further with unjustifiable bureaucratic machinery. Our work must be based, above all, on two factors for which so far no substitute has been found : the good faith of governments and the persuasive force of principle. We shall continue to demand these essential conditions, for, without them, it would be wiser to postpone our hopes to better days.

These are the words of a realist and international statesman.

In conclusion, I plead for a far more critical and constructive attitude towards the network of official agencies now growing up in this and other countries. Cultural conventions on a bi-lateral basis, five power arrangements under the Brussels Treaty, regional organs for Europe and finally UNESCO itself involve a considerable extension of governmental machinery and man-power. Are we sure that results are commensurate with this elaborate machinery ? On the other hand there is much loose talk of a world society and world government. UNESCO is one of many specialized agencies of the United Nations. Its aim is to promote, through education, science and culture, fellowship between the nations of the world and thus contribute to peace and security. Its emphasis is placed on the moral solidarity of mankind. Ordinary people can find ways and means of serving that high ideal, if governments keep faith. But a mere multiplication of government agencies, however efficient, will serve no useful purpose unless there is an upsurge of free and voluntary action from thousands of teachers in school and university in the fifty member-States. I detect signs among our own teachers of a growing awareness, and pay tribute to the National Union of Teachers for fostering of late a more international outlook among its powerful membership. There can be no more potent army of support for the ideas behind UNESCO than a world federation of teachers from the nursery school to the university. But they must believe in the uniqueness as well as in the divinity of the child.

THE INTELLECTUAL IN POLITICS

BY R. D. CHARQUES

DEFINITIONS, said Samuel Butler, are a kind of scratching and generally leave a sore place more sore than it was before. A word on the evolution of the term "intellectual" seems called for, however. From the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which defines an intellectual as "a person possessing or supposed to possess superior powers of intellect," one learns that Byron once conferred the title on Canning. That was in 1813. But in describing Canning as an intellectual Byron was being unreservedly complimentary; he was innocent of the irony or equivocation that belongs to the modern use of the term. The earliest illustration of that, to turn to the *O.E.D.* again, seems to be the reference in the *Daily News* in 1898 to "the intellectuals of Constantinople, who were engaged in discussion while the Turks were taking possession of the city."

Clearly the date of that remark is significant, as significant as its undertone of derision. 1898 marks the distance of a generation from the passing of the Education Act of 1870. We had then, that is, for the first time in our history, an entire generation which had discovered, in however elementary a way, the pleasures of the intellect. We had also, emerging from a more and more highly organized community life, a rapidly expanding administrative, technical and critical *intelligentsia*—a body of intellectuals by vocation, who were perhaps to be distinguished from the merely intelligent by their professional faith in what brains could accomplish. There had always been in England, no doubt, a recognizable body of persons possessing or supposed to possess superior powers of intellect; but, with the progress of a system of national education at a period of the swift diffusion of urban culture, the type became much more numerous and formed a much larger part of the population. With the continued social increase in educational opportunity it began to comprise, in fact, a more or less specific class, and it has been growing steadily bigger as a class, extending its influence in politics and society.

In spite of the prestige and the authority in many spheres which he enjoys, the intellectual in this country still lives under a cloud. That, of course, is a familiar lament of the intellectual himself, a lament not so much that he is not taken at his own valuation as a medium of the higher human activities as that superior

qualities of mind should in themselves apparently be suspect by the rest of the community. Where in particular his contribution to political life is concerned he has almost always to meet the scepticism, the faint but lingering distrust, of the so-called ordinary man. There is general recognition that it falls to the intellectual to articulate the political issues, actual and latent, of the day, but this normally seems to leave a degree of suspicion intact. And, without joining either in the age-long game of baiting the highbrow or in the present fashion of sentimental adulation of the ordinary or common man, it is surely necessary, in this windy aftermath of the anti-intellectual cult of Fascism, to ask rather more purposefully than we have yet done what are the reasons for the latter's continued distrust. Has it any real and rational foundation? Or is it—as in the not dissimilar matter of the equivocal status of the artist—an expression of common-or-garden philistinism? It is perhaps worth while examining the psychological springs of the attitude in general of the ordinary man towards the intellectual by way of commentary on the historical record of the intellectual in politics.

The attitude exhibits, of course, pronounced national characteristics and the English variety, as it happens, is specially instructive. For it is, less paradoxically than may appear, in those countries in which the homage paid to the intellectual has been, on the whole, notably less restrained, less qualified than in our own that his incapacity in political affairs, certainly in the rough and tumble of politics, has been most evident. A few familiar instances only must serve to illustrate the point. Think, for instance, of the catastrophic failure of the Girondin intellectuals, of Sieyès—"that mole of the Revolution"—with his abstract Constitutions; of the absurd showing of Tocqueville, the most magnificent of political theorists, as the champion of Louis Napoleon! Consider once more the spectacle of the Frankfurt intellectuals of 1848 or of the Weimar Constitution-makers. Note how even in Russia, where the Marxist-Leninist intellectuals had seemed to triumph, these in the event were the class most ruthlessly liquidated by the narrow hierarchy wielding effective power. The intellectual has always been an indispensable agent of the revolt of the masses, indeed of all, or almost all, popular political movements, but his limitations as a professional politician are writ large upon the face of modern European history.

In this country the general attitude towards the intellectual, who deals above all in the currency of new ideas, is partly shaped by the prevailing sense of the continuity of English tradition in government, law, and a great deal besides. It is this that gives a special edge of indulgent irony to the attitude towards the middle-class intellectual of conspicuously advanced or extremist views, who more than any other type of intellectual evokes in the ordinary man a consciousness

of class difference—a feeling of what-does-he-know-about-people-like-us ? For the rest it goes without saying that the intellectual suffers in the very first place from the inveterate Anglo-Saxon prejudice in favour of the practical man. That the dichotomy of intellectual and practical man is a false one, that the virtues of many who acquire the latter reputation are in fact hollow or flagrantly overrated, that again and again the intellectual has evidenced supreme practical ability and resource—none of this is immediately relevant. The prejudice takes three familiar forms. Of these the commonest, it must be admitted, more often than not nowadays projects only the confusion of mind of the average citizen in our distracted and crisis-ridden age. The fact is that, among more valid criticisms, intellectuals as a class are frequently censured not so much for what they are as for what they are not and for the most part do not pretend, or do not consistently pretend, to be—men of action. It is a minority only who aspire to lead in practical affairs, to execute policy ; though it is the minority which in this respect tends to establish the reputation of the class as a whole.

The intellectuals of Rome of the third and fourth centuries continued their elaborate exercises in rhetoric while the barbarians disrupted the Empire or, as the classic phrase goes, “thundered at the gates of Rome.” (Though it is scarcely true that they thundered—they merely seeped in.) In much the same way, the contemporary intellectuals of the west are charged with prolonging their debate on the crisis of civilization while the new barbarism seeps in and civilization begins to tumble about our ears. But what else, it may fairly be retorted, should intellectuals do except discuss intellectual matters ? It is, after all, their *métier*. To reproach the intellectual because, at a time of tension or crisis in public affairs, he does not assume the rôle of the hero, the conqueror, the man of destiny—this is only one more instance of the illogical craving to have it both ways.

Yet a suspicion of the intellectual in respect of his function in society surely retains a saving virtue ; for suspicion expresses a sense of the besetting temptations of intellectual arrogance, a lively fear that superiority of mind may set its possessor at a disadvantage in a commonplace emergency, a salutary caution in face of the abstract claims of pure reason, and an alert eye for the pretensions of an army of pseudo-intellectuals. All these combine to produce the second form of the English predilection for the practical man which is implicit in the *mystique* of “character”. Whatever the accretions of specifically middle-class sentiment, or for that matter of national complacency, that are involved here, it is an unexceptionable truism that this is an integral part of the English political genius. The accusation that in this country we are contemptuous of brains comes down in the end to the fact that for a great many purposes, and

especially in public life, English people value brains less than they value other things, particularly the sum of qualities or even idiosyncrasies they call character. There is, it seems, nothing to be done about this scheme of values ; nor, perhaps, when all is said, is anything necessary. For the preference is not, so to speak, an academic one, but is grounded in the conviction, to which much of our political history bears vivid witness, that more is accomplished by force of character than by otherwise unaided intellectual ability.

To this lesson of experience is added, as a third mark of bias in favour of the practical type, a feeling of apprehension where the humanity of the intellectual as theorist is concerned. The commonest terms in which the case against the professional intellectual is advanced to-day take colour from the bureaucratic society we live in. Granted that the proper business of an administrative *intelligentsia* is to theorize and to plan, how often—so it seems to the person at the receiving end, the anonymous and undifferentiated citizen—the theories and plans lose sight of the everyday substance of human lives ! In the past it did not necessarily occur to the reforming intelligence that the destitute were not merely the destitute but men and women, and even in these more enlightened times of the welfare State it still seems necessary to insist that lip-service to “ the human factor ” is no substitute for imagination, still less for fellow feeling, which in this matter of orders and regulations is possibly the source of all virtue. Experience, in brief, tends to confirm the suspicion that the person of demonstrably superior brains engaged in public affairs is apt to lack something of common humanity, something of the common touch. Of James Mill, a prince of reforming intellectuals, Harriet Grote said that “ he was burning with desire to see all his fellow creatures equal, yet was not able to exchange a word with a common, vulgar man without disgust.” That coldness, that aridity of temperament is not seldom a penalty of the exaggerated and disproportionate intellectualism of our age.

Possibly it is the formidable romantic streak in the English character even more than the English devotion to common sense that has spared us the rule of the cleverest in public life. Certainly, however, it is history which suggests that the intellectual, though his function is vital, has as a rule only a restricted part to play in the essential business of politics. Parnell provides, perhaps, a case of intellectual leadership rather than of an intellectual who was a leader, but would the ordinary, very ordinary, men he led have fallen on him so soon as circumstance turned against him if he had been a little less coldly superior of mind ? As for those whose superiority of mind has not been put to the test of practical politics, they have served as a mental laboratory for society, a constant stimulus and provocation to the empirical method. To give the intellectual his head, indeed, as

this country has almost always done, is in effect to restrain him as a politician. We have, after all, taken what we wanted from Bentham, the Mills, the Webbs ; we have never swallowed them whole, and for good reasons. The man who conceived the *Panopticon* ought, one feels, to have turned his hand to another and wilder *Alice in Wonderland* ; as a politician he must have lacked all sense of the art of the practicable. And, whether they were to be regarded as super-Marxist Fabians or super-Fabian Marxists, the unimaginativeness of the Webbs was never so apparent as in the brain-spun unreality of the picture they drew in *Soviet Communism* of the commonplaces of Russian life and government.

Revolutions are made by masses ; periods of instability, which mark the pressure of ideas still at their formative stage upon existing institutions, are mirrored in the minds of intellectuals. It is because their concern is primarily with ideas that their invasion of the field of policy in a period of instability such as the present brings with it needless confusion. The truth is surely that, in this late age of our civilization, the essentially intellectual approach to politics is almost always sterile. For it was only with the rise of modern rationalism, which drew its impulse from scientific discovery and the gospel of material progress, that the western intellectual began to abandon the ideal conception of politics as a branch of moral philosophy, substituting for it that dogma of human perfectibility which marks the present dead end of our civilization. More clearly than at any time before, the creative principle of government cannot be other than a moral principle, nourished not upon the card-index rationalism which derives from the primacy of the intellect in politics but upon an imaginative sense of the human condition. Base government upon a completely rational plan of social behaviour and it must lead, as in fact it has already led, straight to totalitarianism.

To protest against giving the highest priority in politics to the intellect is not to disparage reason, but rather to emphasize our present need of a more broadly based culture. If, indeed, the civilization of the west has become menacingly top-heavy in modern times, may it not be because we have conceded too much in the ordering of our affairs to the bias of superior brain-power ? In the result society has become more and more schizophrenic, torn by a cultural schism between the specialized vocation of the intellectual and the humanity of the ordinary man of which the product is a progressive atrophy of moral and spiritual values. That, perhaps, at the present time is the distinctive malady of the west. There may be something to be learned, after all, from the otherwise dubious system of people's democracy in eastern Europe in which the State rests—at any rate in theory—upon the indissoluble harmony of workers, peasants and intellectuals.

METAPHOR AND ANALOGY

BY JOSHUA C. GREGORY

ARISTOTLE had an oar in every water : so Montaigne metaphorically describes a widely ranging mind. Paley infers from the constructed watch, which has a maker, to the Great Designer of the analogically contrived world. Coleridge distinguishes the analogy that convicts from the metaphor that illustrates. Since analogy is often precarious, and should always be discreet, "convicts" is too strong and misleading. Montaigne's metaphor expresses; Paley's analogy infers.

And like a lobster boil'd, the morn
From black to red began to turn.

Samuel Butler's simile, which openly compares the dawn to a boiled lobster, is converted into a metaphor by "the boiled lobster in the sky began to turn red", which does not avow the comparison. The metaphor is a contracted simile, and the simile an expanded metaphor, as Aristotle noted more than two millennia ago. The metaphor, Charlton remarks, fires poetry more than the cooler simile does. Though the compacted metaphor is usually a more expressive bullet than the more floppy simile, the principle is not absolute. Banquo's simile,

The earth hath bubbles, as the water has,
And these are of them,

cannot be bettered by contracting it into a metaphor. The nature of the metaphor, in any case, is shown more clearly by spreading it into a simile.

Metaphor and analogy compare at least two instances of a general notion. "As an oarsman rows in many waters, so Aristotle discusses many matters," by spreading Montaigne's metaphor into a simile, reveals two instances of varying assuidity. I. A. Richards calls the Aristotle part the "tenor", and the oarsman part the "vehicle": the vehicle describes, the tenor is described. In Paley's analogy the constructed watch and the contrived world are two instances of design. A father lost his spectacles, found them, and lost them again. His little daughter compared dad and his spectacles to Orpheus and Eurydice. Dad-spectacles and Orpheus-Eurydice are two instances of losing, finding, and losing again.

In 1704 Addison wrote *The Campaign*, in heroic couplets, to

celebrate Marlborough's victory at Blenheim. His comparison of Marlborough's calm control over tumultuous battle to an angel's serene direction of the raging storm or wild whirlwind became famous. The simile, because it seems to deserve its fame and also to be no simile at all, puzzles Dr. Johnson into trying to explain why it is effective and yet no simile.

Marlborough, he says, is too like the angel for the apparent simile to be a simile : he "teaches the battle to rage" just as the angel "directs the storm", and he simply repeats the angel "calm in the whirlwind" when he stands "unmoved amidst the shock of hosts." The angel simile is not a simile because it only exemplifies. "As Hecla vomits flames in Iceland, so Aetna vomits flames in Sicily" is not a simile but an exemplification. The comparison of a poet's quest for poetical decorations to a bee collecting honey is a genuine simile because it successfully compares two very unlike things ; Hecla is too like Aetna to be a simile for it.

Johnson virtually insists that a simile must not be analogical. Since both Hecla and Aetna are volcanoes, active volcanoes, Aetna presumably vomits flames as Hecla does. There is no more inference from honey-gathering bee to decoration-collecting poet than from a busy oar to Aristotle's mental assiduity. In effect Johnson's distinction is by *logical distance*. The instances of a simile, or metaphor, are too logically distant to invite any inference ; the instances of an analogy, Johnson's exemplification, are logically close enough to invite it.

The distinction between metaphor, or simile, and analogy comes well under Aristotle's warning not to try to be more precise than the subject matter permits. Comparisons vary continuously between the pure metaphor, with a logical gulf between its instances, and the pure analogy which is used to promote an inference. Since both the busy oar and Aristotle are known to be assiduous, Montaigne uses an admitted likeness. Paley plans his analogy to justify the inferred likeness between the constructed earth and the contrived world. There is, in practice, no sharp line between the pure metaphor, which adopts an admitted resemblance, and the analogy, which tries to establish a likeness.

When Peacock calls poetry the "mental rattle" which stirred the mind of infant man he cannot argue from the stimulating rattle to the stimulus by poetry. A comparison of larger chrysanthemums to elegant cleaning mops is a pure simile, for only a very perverse horticulturist would argue that the flowers are what they are because the mops are what they are. Perhaps this dishonouring simile can suggest how very readily inferences wriggle into similes : the chrysanthemum, after being metaphorically dubbed a cleaning mop, might be ignominiously used as one. Walter de la Mare, less

facetiously, observes that "accordant similes" may be both an "enlivening pleasure" and a cogent intellectual argument. His continuing phrase, "energizing their content by means of analogy as well as example," recognizes the invasion of metaphor by analogical argument or inference. Such analogical persuasiveness invades metaphorical expressiveness in varying degrees.

Marlborough does repeat the angel, perhaps more obviously than the assiduous Aristotle repeats the busy oarsman, but a steadfast mortal Marlborough cannot be presumed to order the confusion, uproar, and slaughter of battle *because* a supernatural angel serenely directs a storm. Orpheus and Eurydice do not even tempt the inference that father will lose his spectacles, find them, and lose them again. Melanthius compares the preservation of Athens by quarrels among its orators to a boat which does not upset because the passengers do not crowd to one side. This simile is an analogical temptation to argue against a one-party State. Roger Bacon fortifies, or energizes, his simile by analogy in: "Wisdom without eloquence is like a sharp sword in the hands of one palsied, whereas eloquence without wisdom is like a sharp sword in a madman's grasp." Eloquence without wisdom is not necessarily dangerous *because* a madman's fury makes his sword a menace, nor is wisdom without eloquence necessarily futile *because* a paralytic fumbles with his sword. Bacon's simile inclines us to belief in the illustrated relations between wisdom and eloquence more strongly than Melanthius convinces us of the weakness in a one-party State. Analogical temptations to infer, however, invade both similes.

Angel-visits have been accused of being tautologically few and far between: "far between" merely saying again what "few" has already said. Five currants in a big bun may be widely scattered or bunched at its centre. The currants are always few; the spread currants are far between, but the bunched currants are not. Angel-visits might be five in a century, and thus few; they might all be paid on the same day, and thus not far between. This analogical disproof is at the lower extreme, and the Orpheus-Eurydice simile at the upper, of a continuous series in which the metaphorical illustration is progressively invaded by more and more cogent analogy.

The pervasive prevalence of metaphor, or simile, needs no argument, as good wine needs no bush. This prevalence drops Walter de la Mare into simile to express it: metaphor "throngs our daily speech" as lichen and moss creep into every available crack. Logan Pearsall Smith notes among the best known habits of language the metaphorical extension of meaning, with its "habitual comparisons", such as "dull as ditch-water", with its constant invention of figurative idioms, such as "to sail too near the wind" and, among many items, with its culinary references, such as "to take with a grain of

salt." Even if the Old High German proverb, "when it blows the trees shake" does not mean "every cause has its due effort", and use an analogical metaphor, proverbs do thrive upon the metaphorical, and aphorisms thrive upon it also, as in La Rochefoucauld's "The emotions are the only orators who always persuade us." Such ostensible metaphor, the obvious metaphors of prose or poetry, the pervasive personification of thought or expression, and the great mass of unobtrusive or unsuspected metaphor which scrutiny reveals, manifest the great indispensable rôle of metaphor.

The analogy is as pervasively prevalent as the metaphor that it so often invades. The *De Plantis* is Aristotelian in temper, though it is probably not from Aristotle's pen. It illustrates the great vogue of analogy by its comparison of a plant to a pot. When water glutinized meal or flour into a sticky lump, or bound powdery clay into a plastic mass, it seemed to ancient minds to be a universal binding agent. The oven bakes the glutinized flour into a firm loaf, and the kiln makes the moulded plastic clay into a hard brick. According to the *De Plantis* the plant contains fire, water and earth—the "fire" is comparable to the later material heat or caloric. The "earth", the clay, makes the plant solid, the water binds the earth into a definite outline, and the fire makes the whole plant hard. As the *De Plantis* frankly compares the plant to a pot, it illustrates how constantly interpretation embodies compelling analogies. Scratch an explanatory concept, or group of interpretative concepts, and find an analogy, or a group of analogies such as those embodied in the pot-like plant.

Spooner did once transpose the initial letters of two words—perhaps "conquering kings" into "kinquering congs". Mischievous legend analogically extended the lapse into "well-boiled bicycle" for "well-oiled bicycle", and a string of Spoonerisms. A kitten chases a ball in play to prepare for chasing the mouse in earnest, and Groos might have applied his principle, preparing by play for the tasks of life, to the sportive Spoonerism when the inherent analogical bent of the mind relished spinning out Spoonerisms by the yard, and sported in play on the great analogical route which is the main pathway of thought. Wherever the mind is active, in sport or in earnest, it deals in analogies, and must deal in them.

Robert Burton, in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, repeats the story of the mule, who carried salt, and the ass, who carried wool. When the mule had been well wetted in a stream, and his burden eased, he told the ass who then practised an analogical extension at the next water. He soused himself well, and made his wool-pack heavier. The ass rashly transferred the situation, pack-wetting-eased burden, from the mule to himself without including soluble matter in it. The transference of the effectively relevant situation

is the duty, difficulty, and danger in analogical extension, and this is a clue to the fundamental rôle of analogy.

If a handful of snow taken from the lawn and dropped down a neck is unpleasant, analogy confidently argues to the similarly unpleasant result of snow from Helvellyn. Analogy is very competent in simple instances where the situation can be known to be transferred quite relevantly. Snow-down-neck is the usually sufficient condition wherever the snow comes from, and whatever neck it is. A completely anaesthetized back would prevent the unpleasantness, though not the wetting. Here the contingency is too remote to trouble, but it does hint that analogy in general cannot be demonstratively certain because the situation may not be quite relevantly transferred. The above model does not include any anaesthesia. Few analogies transfer the situation so completely and evidently as the relation between few and far between is passed on from the currants in the bun to the angel-visits.

The shadow cast by a cliff led early Greek astronomy to the shadow cast by the earth on the eclipsed moon. Astronomy stumbled to its goal—presuming various intervening bodies before it settled on the earth. This simple instance, in which analogy finally led thought home, is significant because the analogical pathway that led from shadows cast on earth to shadows cast through the heavens suggests the great rôle of analogy in the constant movement of human thought.

Preoccupation with analogical *proof* tends to obscure the more fundamental rôle of analogy. Lotze assessed this well in his *Logic* : analogy is not a ground of proof, but a pathway of discovery for the inventive mind. If analogy ever does *prove*, or even give great assurance, it does so relatively seldom, and then only in instances simple or analysable enough to ensure adequate transference of the relevant situation. It notoriously misleads, and discredited analogies strew the path of history. The errors and the essential rôle are closely connected. The mind inevitably interprets the less understood by what is known or previously presumed—it does, and must, think by analogy. Since water makes flour sticky, and clay cohesively plastic, it was supposed to be one of nature's universal binding agents. The inevitable analogical habit of the mind, with its attendant errors, manifest in this clear instance, is manifest to careful scrutiny in all thinking. The vast assemblage of analogies, their numerous successors, and their constant failures have an obvious significance. This significance is very clear in the scientific hypothesis : analogy is the great pathway of the mind, and analogies are its stepping stones.

In the seventeenth century the magnet was often supposed to emit an "effluvium" that clutched the iron, and drew it to itself. Sticky emanations were supposed by some to shoot from rubbed amber, gum on to a straw, and then draw the victim of electrical

attraction back. Various subsidiary notions were applied to make these, and similar explanations, plausible. The lasso, or the clutching arm and hand, or an elephant fetching a bun off a palm with its trunk, or even a chameleon's fly-catching tongue is the obvious analogue in these interpretations of magnetic and electrical attraction. Such various emanative presumptions, though they had a heyday, have been discarded for others. Scientific hypotheses in general, like these supposititious emanations, are based on analogies, and are essentially temporary. Light was once supposed to be swift streaming particles, comparable to showering bullets. It was also supposed to be undulations in an ethereal medium, comparable at first to aerial pulses of sound, and then to up-and-down motions like those of waves on the sea. The modern electromagnetic propagation, after it has lost its ether to undulate in, and been rescued from sheer enigma by housing in mathematical equations, still recognizes its analogical origin in the wave. Modern electromagnetic radiation, presenting wave and particle aspects, recognizes its two great promoting analogies—the *wave* of the sea, and the flying *projectile*. Present physics has obviously proceeded from hypothesis to hypothesis, from temporary supposition to temporary supposition, each embodying an analogy, or analogies. These instances sample the route of science through the centuries from hypothesis to hypothesis, and yet to further hypotheses, all based on analogies. As the mind passes from one interpretation to another, it uses analogies as stepping stones along its great pathway of analogy.

Hobbes compares the passions of a single man to the heat of one burning brand, and those of an assembly to the fiercer heat of many brands which "enflame one another, especially", he adds parenthetically, "when they blow one another with Orations." Though he uses metaphor freely, as when he compares subjects before their sovereign to stars outshone by the sun, he is often hard on the metaphor, either as an orator's tool to stir passions or as a ruin of scientific precision by ambiguity. Metaphors deceive, Hobbes reiterates, but they seem to be less dangerous if, as he also says, "they openly professe deceit." The metaphor, however, has its dangers.

The stars shine out in the darkness like lamps lit nightly in the heavens, and disappear in the day like lamps put out. Celestial lamps, daily put out and nightly lit by the divine hand, can acceptably express the divine power in metaphor. Illegitimate analogy invaded metaphorical charm to mislead Chaldean and Egyptian astronomers into arguing from the terrestrial candle to the actual stellar lamp. The Polynesians who called a watch "moon", because it is round and keeps awake at night, probably drew no disappointing inference. The Indian chief did when he sent two braves to steal the eggs of an aeroplane, for, though the machine is metaphorically a

bird because it flies, it is not analogically an egg-laying flier.

The attractive metaphors of early thought were very open to convincing analogy. The stars do move like gleaming studs in a great revolving crystalline spherical shell, and Anaximenes, in the sixth century B.C., analogically converted the metaphor into fact. The "deceit" was not openly enough professed for Anaximenes not to be an unwitting victim of a persuasive metaphor.

The flying aeroplane quite naturally seemed to the Indian chief to be more like a bird than it is, for in his experience flying and egg-laying were closely conjoined. In the seventeenth century a writer who compared the iron drawn by the lodestone to a child embraced by its mother would not be too metaphorical for those who credited the magnet with an emanative clutch. Maine, in *Ancient Law*, calls analogy the "most valuable of instruments in the maturity of jurisprudence" and "the most dangerous of snares in its infancy." Growing experience, in jurisprudence and elsewhere, gradually distinguishes expressive metaphors from more interpretative analogies. The whole conceptual field, organized by knowledge and insight, ultimately determines the estimate of an analogical inference. Human experience learns to discard many seductive analogies, as the ass regretted his rash inference; it learns to handle analogies more as clues than as guarantees, with an eye to possible alternatives, and it learns to handle them discreetly, though the lesson is hard to learn and often forgotten, that the better part of analogy is so very often discretion.

The Venerable Bede applies analogy to the metaphor by inferring from metaphor in the bible to the legitimacy of metaphor in poetry. The prevalence and inevitability of metaphor sweep this analogy into acceptance, though the poet might have been considered presumptuous to write like the bible. Metaphor has connections with allegory. The analogical extension of allegory in the bible, real or presumed, to allegory as an integral part of poetry is less convincing now than it was to many medieval minds. The convincingness of an analogy depends greatly on the conceptual field or mental milieu.

In the first cosmic moment of the Epicurean cosmogony the atoms fell in a hurtling rain, through the unfathomable void. Each atom kept its place in the fall until, from time to time, some atoms swerved, clashed into others, and the universe was the cosmic consequence. This is still dramatic enough to gratify aesthetically, though its science is no longer plausible.

The metaphor belongs to the aesthetic; the analogy belongs more, though not only, to logic or science. Time and supplanting successors can wither analogies away, but they leave the splendid metaphor still splendid.

O thou art fairer than the evening air
Clad in the beauty of a thousand stars.

Marlowe's lines are beautiful and remain so even if Helen was less lovely than idealizing tradition avers, or if there never was a Helen, or if they should happen to describe an unknown beauty. "An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, and Athens but the rudiments of Paradise" : Dr. South's aphorism lives on in its metaphor when it no longer lives on in its concept.

Science, however, has its aesthetic side, as Croce says, and the analogy is kin enough to the metaphor to retain its aesthetic appeal on occasion. The pot in the plant is scientifically a faded analogy, but it is still a pleasing fancy, though it cannot vie with Marlowe's poetry.

AT DAYBREAK

BY RUTH TOMALIN

AT daybreak one owl cried
across the darkness dimming :
in drowsy crystal treble,
minute, a chinking pebble,
a whitethroat from the green wild rose replied.

Like young swans swimming
the willows shivered grey ;
white clover's gossamer
bent under Lucifer,
his brilliance sinking sullen into day.

The owl-cry hovered far :
faint from the forest rang
echo on echo set,
most wan and desolate,
as though a spectre wailed within the star.

The whitethroat piping sang :
out of the briar snows
one drop of music spilled,
so murmurously trilled
it seemed the dew had spoken from the rose.

AFTER DARK

By S. L. BENSUSAN

WHEN I go back to the village in which I spent the most care-free years of my life, a walk after night has set in, yields rich reward for the long cross-country journey. The church clock sounds the hour, the village has retired within itself ; at ten o'clock the *Wheatsheaf*, the *Dog and Duck* and the *Lone Hand* dismissed the last of their patrons.

The civil 'good-night' that may greet you as a wayfarer passes is not a mere expression of good will ; it is an inquiry ; your voice should be recognized in response ; if unfamiliar you are a 'furriner' and what is called 'enquiration' will be made to find out whence you come and why. "We don't want folk come pezzickin' about here what don't belong" Father William told me in days when Queen Victoria reigned, "we belong to ourselves we do" and this attitude persists to this day among folk whose horizon is bounded by their immediate surroundings, in spite of the 'moty bus', the 'sharry bang' and the 'little old contraption' to which you turn for 'a band o' music', a contraption that has the offensive habit of talking to you whiles, instead of keepin' all on with the band o'music aforesaid. But the civil greeting roused a train of thought, a train that went over points leading to scenes half a century gone. The night resumes her sway and calls upon shadows to return.

Lamps still shine behind window curtains, at the *Wheatsheaf* those curtains are red and the glow they cast on to the road suggests hospitality. The landlady and all her family have passed, but one of night's shadows becoming luminous I find myself back in the sitting room with its cheerful fire, enjoying a hot, well-cooked meal preparatory to a lonely three miles tramp to the sea wall and the saltings. Heavy boots treated with mutton fat, gun, cartridges, oil skins that defy the weather are all in readiness, for this particular shadow comes from the far off days when shooting wild-fowl seemed to be a legitimate pastime. My kind landlady looks in, glances at my plate and warns me not to 'flinch from my appetite.' "That's cowl enough to flee ye," she says, "but I've a brick in the oven an' I'll wrop it in flannel an' set it in y'r bed, agin you're home."

Bedroom, sitting room, fire, three meals a day, hearty words of welcome, all for twenty-five shillings a week in those days.

Now the *Wheatsheaf* is left behind and I am passing the thatched

cottage of Granfeyther, luckiest man in the district, one who bought his beer by the barrel, 'fatted' his own pig and tended his forty rod of ground so that it yielded all he needed of fruit and vegetables. Another shadow intervenes, it is Father William, Oldest Inhabitant, explaining why Granfeyther has been so lucky: "Granfeyther an' me grew up together like. He was just a common man same as me, an' a poachful varmint ever anybody see. Time he merried he han't the price of a poun' o' cheese but he kep all on, an' should say that dedn't matter any. 'What's enough f'r one's enough f'r two,' he tow'd me, th' liar; you gotter feed a woman an' keep her in boots an' she'll want a dress whiles, its likely. But Granfeyther was allus double cunnin'. Took overtime and done odd jobs o' Sunday stiddy gooin' to Church same as a Christian should, an' got two boys along of his wife an' each of 'em a mischieful little varmint ever anybody met. One of 'em went on to the rileway time he grew up an' a trine knocked him down an' killed him an' that rileway pide Granfeyther forever o'money. Then th' tother boy what worked f'r th' brewers in Market Waldron got run over by a van, time a hornet stung one o' the harses an' it run away, an' th' brewers pide Granfeyther too. His wife doloured after that, bein' she bin fond o' them boys. Ouldn't eat her vittles, ouldn't take no interest an' went off dead, so Granfeyther hadn't got anybody to look after 'cept himself an' forever o' money to spend. He kin set at home like a lord an' they do say he got two beer warmers stiddy one, an' two o' th' headest pigs ever anybody see. That's wholly shaimeful, that's what that is."

The shadow passes and Granfeyther is visible in the ingle nook; the two beer warmers are a fact and not merely a rumour. He is a very old man, grey bearded, bent, shrewd, grizzled, smiling. "Father William allus was enviable o' me," he remarks tranquilly, "but I don't take no heed o' th' likes o' he. I got me beer an' me baccy an' me bacon, an' Martha Pewter comes most mornin's an' turns me out an' cooks me a mite o' vittles. An' I'm me own landlord mind ye. A man don't want to live in another man's house my time o' life, ne yet work on another man's land, an' if you want to see me cask o' beer I'll take ye down th' cellar to have a peep at it. I know you don't drink, more's th' pity. Th' dear Lord 'ouldn't ha' sent us beer if he han't wanted we should enjoy it; that's sarten." This last a little reproachfully.

Once again the shadows gather in the country lane until light breaks out, the two lamps of a carrier's cart drawn by a very old horse and driven by a grey haired, clean shaven, keen eyed elderly man who checks an animal all too ready to stop and seek wayside herbage. "I am wholly pleased to see you my friend," says the carrier, for this is Ephraim the well beloved, "how do you howd? Thank you, friend," he goes on in reply to question, "th' dear Lord bin an' dealt

wunnerful bountifully along o' me. I do hear tell of vans with innards to them like them moty cars you may have seen now an' agen. But th' dear Lord bin an' kep' 'em out o' these parts an' I doubt He on't let 'em in. Do you come to Chapel o' Sunday an' hear us wrastle with th' dear Lord an' testify an' sing praises, same as King David bin an' done afore the Ark. A man wanter come to Chapel an' be saved," he continues. "If he goo to Church, Rev. Spiller'll make a heathen of him sure. Incense they tell me, an' dress themselves up an' believe in Transubstation what is a false an' pornishous doctrine an' Rev. Spiller no more to do but takes tithe off o' ye what he dedn't oughter, being' he ain't o' th' tribe o' Levi ne yet half th' tribe o' Manasseh. An' they do tell me that he's a friend o' th' owd Pope o' Rome an' I shouldn't wonder if that ain't true. It's hard enough to fight the Devil without havin' to fight Rev. Spiller an' th' Pope o' Rome atop o' that. Fare thee well, friend."

Night and Time and Eternity have taken the carrier but those who knew him will not let his memory perish. How he loved little children, how hard he worked, how slenderly he fared. Even the confirmed beer drinkers of the *Wheatsheaf* welcomed him when he called on a Saturday night, to be provided with a pot of tea because he would only drink "the cup what cheers an' don't ineberate." He would pour the brew into his saucer and drink it loudly and defiantly as though to the confusion of all intemperate men.

A little wiry man is walking by me now, his mongrel, Timber, at heel. Miserably poor and very shabby, he lives in a tumble down, two-room cottage on the edge if Sandy Waste ; as poacher he is second to none. Before meeting him there was a fixed belief in my mind that I knew something worth knowing about woodcraft ; he undeceived me. Suspected by the policeman, mistrusted by farmers, indefatigable in pursuit of rabbits and equally ardent in pursuit of beer when he had sold his catch under the rose to men who had no difficulty in getting twice as much as they paid him, he had only one friend in the world, the lurcher that he sometimes kicked and cuffed when beer had taken charge. But when Timber was killed, it was a tragic business ; old man Semple pined and died. To-night he has walked silently by me. He used to poach my shooting, even admitted as much, but once in serious trouble he came to me because he knew of no one else who could and would lend a hand. Thereafter he became as friendly as was possible to one of his make up and would walk by my side as he has done to-night. He brought with him the stillness of woodland, the loneliness of that two-roomed hovel, the unspoken story of privation, the dumb gratitude for an occasional gift of food that he would share with Timber.

Now he has gone and I am trying to console Mrs. Packet whose apron is busy with her eyes. She stands at her garden gate, the moon

has just struggled through a cloud as though to light her honest ugly face. "Time my Fred ast me to let him be a Terriertorial," she explains, "nobody said nawthen to me about his gooin' out furrin', an' now they bin an' sent him a piece o' piper an' he gotter goo an' kill Jarmans. If I'd ha' known they'd do that, they shouldn't ha' had my Fred. That was a dirty bit of 'em, trickin' a pore widder-woman what bin an' lost her husban'. An' he wanted to goo, towed me he'd like hisself out furrin' an' dedn't mind killin' Jarmans an' that I worn't to dolour, being' he'd come back." (He did.)

She passes and gives place to a large, spectacled, middle-aged woman who carries about her honesty writ large. She has just settled herself in a hard wooden chair by the fire in her living room, a kettle suspended from a crane sings cheerfully, "I've been traipsin' about till I'm wholly wanked," she explains, "an' now I'll have a cup o' tea an' a morsel o' toast with a mite o' bloater paste atop of it. There's Sarah Wotter bin laid aside with twinses an' she's took all me arternoon, an' this mornin' I laid out pore old Saul Dynes. That come to him mortal sudden. I thought his legs'd ha' took him to his bed o' sickness but that wore his heart in the end. What with th' dead an' th' livin' I couldn't git no dinner, but I don't mind. I ain't like th' young hussies with cerstifikits stiddy brines what want waitin' on. I can't abide 'em an' that's th' trewth. They're void of everythin' in th' way o' lookin' arter anybody."

The Rector stands in the porch. He is not the man long since dead who excited the wrath of the carrier but one cast in different mould. "Come in," he says heartily. "I'm alone and I'll be glad of a chat." I look round; we are in his study, the table at which he works carries a big Greek lexicon and a commentary on Isaiah with much Hebrew quotation, for Rector is a student of Greek and Hebrew, and his other loves are his orchard and his bees. And when he starts to tell about the bee garden it seems as though, if only for a moment, the winter night has given way to a late April afternoon. We are very many miles from the village, very many years from the actualities of the twentieth century, talking of bees in terms of the Georgics, and of Old Testament prophecy in terms of its greatest exponents. In this poor parish and gaunt vicarage I have found these many years a man after my own heart. "I must be going now," he says suddenly, and I remember that in the churchyard on the hill top there is a stone with his name on it and under name and date a line:

Now when the morning dawned Jesus stood on the shore:

The shadows return, the road is familiar, here at last are the lights of home. "I hope you've enjoyed your lonely tramp," says my smiling host from his chair by the fireside. "I wasn't alone," I explain.

CORRESPONDENCE

INDO-CHINA AND HOME RULE

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

I have read with attention Mr. David Ingber's article on "Indo-China and Home Rule" which appeared in your March issue, and should like to offer the following comments :

1. In reporting upon the large increase in population that took place in Indo-China between 1875 and 1940, your correspondent seems to imply that the French colonial system was thus most beneficial to the country. What he fails to point out is that this demographic expansion was not accompanied by any proportionate improvement in standards of living. The economic and industrial backwardness of Indo-China has been repeatedly evidenced by such authoritative French writers as Paul Bernard, Pierre Gourou and Charles Robequain.

2. The Viet Minh, writes your correspondent, emerged in 1941-1942 as a coalition of anti-French Home Rule Parties. In fact, ever since its foundation, the Viet Minh has never ceased to give proof of its anti-imperialist, anti-Fascist, but in no way anti-French, conviction. As late as September 1944 it was still issuing appeals to French Gaullists in Indo-China, as distinct from the Vichyites, to join in a common, anti-Fascist front. Personal evidence afforded by French people as M. and Mme. Bernard, former lecturers at the Lycée of Hanoi, points to the reality and consistency of that attitude.

3. This is the true story of the so-called "liquidation of all opposition elements throughout the republic" : it was actually after the signing of the March 6 Preliminary Convention that the opponents of the agreement, the Kuomintang-controlled Dong Minh Hoi and Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dan started up trouble and disorders in Tongking, under the benevolent eyes of the Chinese troops. The Government of the Republic had to suppress this agitation, which even General Leclerc, French C. in C. at the time, regarded as prejudicial to the Republic and to Franco-Vietnamese relations. As for the myth of Tong Bo, the "secret committee" was in fact a Council similar to the French Resistance National Council, in which every member party and organization within the Viet Minh was represented.

4. It seems that your correspondent, in reporting the creation of the "Autonomous Republic of Cochin China" long after giving an account of the Fontainebleau Conference, has failed to realize the full significance of that move. It was in fact on the very day that President Ho Chi Minh and his Cabinet delegation left for France (June 1) that the French High Commissioner Admiral d'Argenlieu, in violation of the March Convention, set up this "Government", thus divesting the Conference of most of its purpose and causing the suspension and subsequent collapse of negotiations. It was a clear indication of the frame of mind of the French authorities in Indo-China.

5. On October 31, the date of the coming into effect of the Modus Vivendi, the French press was unanimous as to the perfect order prevailing in Viet Nam, and notably in Cochin China, where the situation had been tense. It cannot be held, as your correspondent states, that: "Early in October it became obvious that there was

no way of avoiding a clash." It is irrelevant to discuss the question of responsibility for the extension of hostilities in December 1946. The Vietnamese have at their disposal even more documents than the French, and testimonies of many people, clearing them of the charge. What is patent, however, is the numerous violations on the part of the French of the Annexed Military Convention of April 3, 1946, and French guilt in the Haiphong Incident where their planes bombed the town and exacted a toll of over 20,000.*

6. Your correspondent tells the story of how the "Provisional Central Government of South Viet Nam" came into being on May 20, 1948. In fact, the name "South Viet Nam" belongs to the originally Cochinese Government set up during the Fontainebleau Conference. Its history was not a happy one. Its first leader, Dr. Thinh, committed suicide on November 2, 1946; his successor, Dr. Hoach, resigned on September 29, 1947; and when General Xuan took over on October 2 of the same year, its name was changed to Government of South Viet Nam instead of Autonomous Republic of Cochinese China, in order to conceal the separatist implications of the previous denomination and to appease the people who felt more and more strongly against it. Eventually, the June 5 (1948) protocol, signed between General Xuan and French High Commissioner Bollaert, in the presence of Ex-Emperor Bao Dai, created a "Provisional Central Government of Viet Nam", which included all three provinces, Tongking, Annam and Cochinese China.

7. As regards the character of President Ho, may I merely refer to the statement of a high consular official to a Reuter correspondent, reported in the *Indian Daily News*, Singapore, of August 20, 1947? According to this observer, who had just returned from a trip to Indo-China, Ho Chi Minh is the greatest statesman in Indo-China, if not in South East Asia.

Yours faithfully,

DANG-CHAN-LIEU,

Press Service.

République Démocratique du Viêt-Nam,
Delegation in France,
1 bis, rue de Vaugirard, Paris VI.

IS GERMANY BEING DEMOCRATIZED ?

To the Editor of the FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

At present two alternatives are given to Germans: the west or the east. It would be a fallacy to suppose that the German population in the Eastern Zone is in the majority pro-Russian. But whatever German opinion of the Russians may be, there seems no doubt that many Germans feel that, if they prove themselves deserving and faithful, the U.D.S.S.R. will help the German people to revive a new Germany. The centre of industry in the Eastern Zone consists of Soviet Aktiengesellschaften (SAG's

* This figure was given by M. Léon Boutbien, former assistant to the then Minister of France Overseas, in a report he wrote after their mission to Indo-China following the December 19 outbreak.

or Soviet owned companies) and Volkseigene Betriebe (factories owned by the people). While the SAG's are directly controlled by Russian officials, who are nominally directors, all the Volks-owned factories are controlled by convinced German communists. That means that the whole economic system of the Russian Zone is entirely directed by Russia's communist policy and is made an instrument of communist aims.

In opposition to the eastern zone of this country the western zones have a free economy which may and does have a strong influence on German political opinion. History shows that after the Red Revolution of Russia in 1917 many Germans did their best to be democrats as long as German economy was inclined to the west. Later the influence of the east became stronger and stronger; the German political state of mind was in danger of swinging over to the communist side. People in Germany forsook democracy not because they did not want the parliamentary system as such, but because the western Allies had failed to give a chance of making a democratic economy possible here in Germany. Germans have abandoned this democracy and all the men belonging to it, because it was too weak to give the German people enough bread. But the bulk of German opinion did not want Communism and therefore there was in the past little opposition to Hitler's anti-communist campaign. The democrats helped Hitler to power; for example, Versailles, which made any future hopes, especially on the economic side, impossible.

How did the Anglo-Americans take Hitler's success? From 1933 up to 1939 they sent their diplomats to make most favourable recommendations to Hitler in the Nazi meetings, etc. They did their best to benefit the Hitler prestige.

That is the background to Hitler's rise—and once more it is exactly the background to-day. The people in Germany are fed-up with being promised things they do not get. At a time when the world is crying from hunger and even dying from a lack of industry, the Occupation Forces still pursue a policy of destruction of the most important gigantic industrial equipment in western Germany.

To imagine that enormous industrial equipment, which in Germany represents work for many thousands of workers, could be transported across the face of the globe, put up again and be still of the same value is nonsense. But this is still going on. For example, before dismantling, a factory was valued at 120 millions marks; when it was pulled down, it was valued at 9.5 million marks. Well, of all the idiotic ways to influence German opinion, this is one of the worst. It means less essential goods to all Europe and greater delay in the recovery of the world. It should be clear, if you do not allow the German wheels of industry to get going again, you also will not be able to put an end to the waste of your tax-payers' money.

The decision, whether the Germans will turn to the western or to the eastern side is entirely in the hands of the Occupying Powers. It is up to either side to establish an economy which will sway the whole German nation.

Yours faithfully,

HARRY SCHOEFL.

Berlin.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

DAVID CECIL'S DIVINING-ROD

BY PATRIC DICKINSON

IN noticing a book of critical essays, reviewers far too often fall into the heinous trap of self-esteem. A famous figure in the book is picked out because the reviewer wants to flaunt his own erudition, and the review becomes an appended essay, or a sketch for a study which the reviewer thinks he would have written far better himself. But it is the reviewer's duty to assess the critic, if he can, and to discover his particular contribution to criticism. Jane Austen or Turgenev or Fanny Burney* do not need another thousand words. To write of Lord David Cecil requires far more.

There are, very roughly, two kinds of serious critic : those who impose their personalities and tastes upon literature as a whole—these are the dogmatists, the moralists, the fanatics, who set up "touchstones", or who initiate systems and theories into which the creative of past and present must fit or be damned. But there are also the unmoral, the interpretative, who seek to disclose what is good and bad in each particular writer, using not their own but the writer's aesthetics and ethics to do so : these in fact are more eager to discover what a writer is, than what he is not.

There are also of course, in every age, the "chorus of irresponsible indolent reviewers" who without having read the canon of great criticism, without having more than a rudimentary knowledge of the tools of their trade, are prepared to knock down and set up like the proprietors of an Aunt Sally. These are always the majority, and it is distressing to see how often critics of potential value join their ranks. Not long ago, and in Oxford, a very well known dramatic critic observed that it did not matter if dramatic critics nowa-

days had any knowledge of past critics or of the technique of acting or of the theatre of the present. If Lord David Cecil heard of this, it can only have served to strengthen his belief in his own critical values.

He is a first-rate interpretative critic, and his whole outlook defines the profound difference between the well-read and the well-educated mind. (And which is to be the aim of the State-aided, and therefore so often conscience-stricken, university student—conscience stricken because he is under various forms of obligation ? He reads, but does he have leisure for reflection and application ?) David Cecil by powers of mind sees to the core of a writer and shows clearly and logically where he succeeds and fails in his own self-appointed aim, or in the aim for which he subconsciously strives. Good critics, like good dentists, do not pretend not to hurt ; but they tell you when, and why, they are going to hurt—and in relation to what is sound.

In reading the work of such a critic we are conscious always of a double trial of his worth. How far is he able to illumine great writers whom we already know well ? How far does his analysis of works unknown to us stimulate our desire to read them ? Too often appreciation of the interpretative critic depends entirely upon our having read the works subjected to criticism, though in an educated society there will always be a corpus of work we must be assumed to have read. It is too easy for the interpretative critic to "discover" the sonnets of some obscure clergyman and, confident in the knowledge that we will not have read them, make extravagant claims. What is necessary is to see

how such a critic comes off when attempting to write of the great : of Shakespeare, or Webster.

Unlike the critical Mr. Eliot, Lord David Cecil does not wrap up his judgments in a tissue of retreating qualifications and conditionals. His prose is direct, *sensible*, and witty. As a critic his tendency is to pursue and reveal the aesthetic. What a pleasure it is to read such a sentence as this.

Shakespeare was not a moralist. He appreciated goodness and disliked evil ; but he did not approach life primarily from a moral point of view. He was an observer and an aesthete.

But this tendency does not stultify his brilliant insight into the moral purpose behind the most violent melodramatics of Webster. Indeed this essay must be one of the very few really illuminating statements about the poet : perhaps it is the best piece of creative criticism in the book.

Many readers may turn, first of all, to his estimates of Virginia Woolf and E. M. Forster, in which the latter comes off very second best. Unerringly he sets the drill to Mr. Forster's softnesses :

His heroines are not masculine, but they are strangely sexless ; nervous, honest, unaware of their bodies, preoccupied with intellectual problems.

Or, going deeper—

The deep-seated inhibitions of a lifetime are surely not to be removed by an hour's schoolboy-ragging or even by bathing naked in company. Salvation by romps is not a credible concept. But perhaps at heart Mr. Forster does not think it either.

Young critics should particularly note the last sentence, where the drill is lifted, and one is told to rinse the mouth.

Of Virginia Woolf he is aware that "the ugly and aesthetically unimportant she passes by ; or admits them only as they serve as foil to the beauty that preceded or follows them." But at the end of a most penetrating and subtle exposition of her attitude to life and her art, he exclaims :

How cleansing it is to be transported, if only for an hour, to a region where it is more important to be clever than to be good, and more important to be beautiful than to be either !

Lord David Cecil in contradistinction

to "those earnest personages, the professional critics of literature" is, in its truest sense, an *amateur*. He is a critic because he has a deep regard for and appreciation of literature, and he chooses to criticize those writers who arouse his emotions. This is important for emotion recollected in tranquillity, and then subjected by a brilliant logical mind to a dissection of its causes—this is surely a key to true creative criticism. Malice, bitterness, envy—it is forgotten that Envy is one of the seven deadly sins—these are emotions which too often motivate the critic and reviewer, and get in the way of a balanced judgment.

Lord David Cecil goes so far perhaps as to prefer the beautiful to the moral, as in love one is likely to do, but he knows, as Flecker did, "that art is divided not into decadent and healthy, classic and romantic, but into the two mighty divisions of Good and Bad, and that these divisions alone hold true." David Cecil's divining-rod is a really sensitive instrument, and like Flecker, he combines a French clarity of mind, with an English, but wholly unsentimental warmth of emotion. He has style. Is there another critic of such excellent and manifold gifts writing to-day ? Here is a model critic and a model for criticism.

ITALY AND ITALIANS, by Count Carlo Sforza. *Frederick Muller*. 12s. 6d.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN SWISS EXPERIENCE (1291-1948), by William E. Rappard. *George Allen & Unwin*. 12s. 6d.

Mr. Edward Hutton, prince of the *cognoscenti* of things Italian, has now placed us further in his debt by translating this sheaf of papers, the substance of a lecture course which Count Sforza was invited to give at the University of California during the war (in 1943). What Elizabeth Wiskemann did last year for the political story Count Sforza has achieved in respect of *italianità* in the broadest sense. Too slight to merit the name of essays, these

papers do project some welcome shafts of light on the national being.

Count Sforza begins, appropriately, by focussing our attention on the city-state, the key-note of Italian history :

There is no other nation whose traditions, legends and popular epic are compelled so constantly to look to the city for their origin.

He observes, justly, that the link of the countryman with the city in Italy is "one of the permanent strands of the Italian social fabric" : family ties are spoken of as being with this or that town, not with the various regions. The limits of the Italian provinces, he reminds us—except for Fascist innovations—still correspond largely with the limits of the Roman *civitates*. Another acute observation, incidentally, is that a country so saturated with history does not require to be specially conscious of having been the cradle of the Roman Empire : withal, at times when the current of national life flows sluggishly, the feeling of discontent traditionally finds an outlet in tinsel rhetoric about *romanità*. He finds the true life of Italy much nearer to the turbulence of Greece than to the official discipline of Rome.

The chapter on Italians and their literature singles out the incomparable Dante, then Manzoni and Leopardi, as being the most characteristic figures. Proper tribute is paid to Mazzini and Cavour, though one feels that there was room for mention of other heroes of the Risorgimento and the immediately following epoch. With justice the author claims that, while taking on political forms, the movement for Italian unity was primarily a spiritual one. Liberalism was the common catalyst ; but, inevitably, the stream divided into right and left currents. What is noteworthy is that not one of the Liberal protagonists "ever thought of the necessity of social reforms as happened in England."

This is almost the only observation of direct political import for to-day—except for a casual reference to the new Italy setting the example of decentralization. There is, too, however, a searing

page of quotations from sycophantic letters written to *Il Duce* by Dino Grandi when he was Ambassador in London.

Count Sforza includes a pleasant little chapter in praise of Switzerland, as one of Italy's neighbours :

What distinguishes the Swiss from their three great neighbours is that they not only believe but feel that their bureaucracy and the State itself both belong to the citizens.

And the author does not fail to point the obvious moral :

the more we speak of European solidarity, the more we aspire to an organized Europe, the more we must take Switzerland as our ideal, for Switzerland, more than any other State, has found the way to marry federal rights with a lively cantonal independence.

Professor Rappard's extremely interesting commentary comes pat to the occasion. This abridged version of his *Cinq Siècles de Sécurité Collective* appears here under the impulsion of Mr. Lionel Curtis, on paper made available by the "Pro Helvetia" Foundation from Switzerland through the good offices of the Swiss Minister in London. The author traces the process of development through the original mutual alliance of cantons, towns, principalities and Alpine districts known as "the Helvetic Body", the various "federal" adjustments brought about by Napoleon's intervention up to the Confederation of 1848, when the present federal constitution was adopted. The analogy of the League of Nations with its "microcosmic antecedent" is complete, but the point to note is that both, after a signal failure, sought for more effective forms of collective security, and the Swiss cantons found them in the establishment of a federal state.

The book analyses first the laws and then the facts of collective security in Switzerland. The author's conclusion, not unnaturally, is that, whereas the lesson of Swiss experience from 1291 to 1798 is "internationally unconvincing," Switzerland's achievement since offers the essential remedy for the world's troubles. *Ceteris paribus* federalism would certainly appear to be the international panacea, only *ceterae* are not *pares*, and "it depends what you mean" by federation.

WILLIAM RYDAL.

BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
by E. C. R. Hadfield and James E.
MacColl, J.P. *Hutchinson's*
University Library. 7s. 6d.

**THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LAW**, by the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry
Slessor. *Hutchinson's University*
Library. 7s. 6d.

These two books form part of a series designed both for the general reader who requires a systematic introduction to a subject that interests him and for the student with the same object in mind. The question that arises, irrespective of the merits of any particular contribution to the series, is whether the market is not being saturated with this type of literature. It is apparent that this question has presented itself to the minds of Mr. Hadfield and Mr. MacColl, for they say, in their Preface, that : " So many short introductions to local government exist that an apology is necessary for another. This book claims no especial merit except that it is not written by professional historians nor by local government officials, but by two men who have each spent more than ten years in local politics." If any such apology is required the same kind of plea can be made on behalf of Sir Henry Slessor's book, for its author not only has fifteen years of service in the Court of Appeal but previously had experience as a Law Officer of the Crown.

For both of these books to have been read with interest by one who has read a good deal about local government and whose profession is the law means that they have passed at least one fairly severe test. The book on local government succeeds in being a conscientious and comprehensive introduction to the subject but it is also a great deal more ; for the authors have a passionate faith in the importance of keeping local government local without being unconscious of the strains that modern conditions impose upon authorities that are small enough for this purpose.

The theme of the book is that our

system of local government must be recast but that the essentials of the present order must be conserved :

... before long we shall have to lay out our whole local government system afresh to meet the needs of the present age, as our Victorian forbears did in their time. When that time comes, it is for the people to insist that, whatever changes take place in powers and areas, it remains local (in that it has to do with a group of people with something of a common outlook) and that it remains government (in that it is not a mere delegation of powers from the central government). Only those requirements are essentials of the British tradition : all else is adaptation to need.

The book is vigorously and vividly written, and the authors take all their fences with the combination of confidence and care that show the true master at work. It is only when they pass from local government to central government that the authors' touch falters : their analogy, for example, between committees in Parliament and committees in local government is quite false, and their statement that the member of Parliament " gives himself to legislation alone " could scarcely be more inaccurate. But these are only minor blemishes on this excellent little book.

Sir Henry Slessor's book is similar in that while its object is exposition its main interest lies in the views expressed. It is almost an impertinence to say of a former Lord Justice of Appeal that his review of the machinery of our Courts is adequate, but in itself the subject scarcely lends itself to fine writing or even to profound thinking, and it is difficult to know what more to say about this aspect. What is illuminating and sometimes perhaps provocative, is the author's point of view, for Sir Henry is not only an experienced judge but an individual thinker with a systematic and integrated philosophy. His views on juries—with which it is perhaps fair to say that he has mainly been acquainted only when they have gone wrong—and on departmental tribunals would certainly not receive universal acceptance. His strictures on specializations at the bar, on the

uncritical multiplication of law reports, on excessive dependence on legal authority, and on modern lawyers' fears of making bold generalizations, certainly command respect and the most careful consideration.

W. T. WELLS.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE BILL PROCEDURE AND STANDING ORDERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Volume I. By O. Cyprian Williams. *His Majesty's Stationery Office.* 17s. 6d.

The author spent forty years in the service of the House of Commons, his final post being Principal Clerk of the Committee and Private Bill Office. Thus he was favourably placed for observing the procedure of Private Bill Legislation in operation, and conducting researches into its history and development. In this book, he provides a detailed history of Private Bill procedure in the House of Commons, and the gradual development of the body of Standing Orders of that House dealing with such business, from its beginnings in 1685 to the latest large-scale revision in 1945.

The history gives evidence of immense care on the part of the House, through investigations by Committees and discussions in the House, to provide a wise code of procedure for this important side of its legislative work, and to keep that code adapted to meet the changing needs of the national life. It evidences also the importance which the House has always attached to this branch of legislation, a unique feature of our parliamentary system, which comes little under the notice of the general public, but has been largely responsible for the high quality and smooth working of our local government and public service undertakings.

The book deals only with procedure, and not with the substantive matters, such as railways, tramways, harbours, water, gas and electricity supplies, buildings and sanitation, that are dealt with in Private Bills.

Such a history must necessarily have

its chief interest and importance for those who are actually concerned, continuously or at intervals, in Private Bill proceedings. But the book is far from devoid of interest for the general reader.

The early stages of the history are of particular interest. It is one of the main characteristics of a Private Bill that it starts with a Petition for leave to introduce a Bill, deposited on behalf of some body or person outside Parliament by whom the special legislation is desired. But public legislation also originated in petitions to the King by subjects desiring redress of grievances, and this book shows how the two branches of the legislative process gradually become separated, the Private Bill system having the more elaborate code of procedure, enabling Parliament to deal justly and effectively with private and local interests affected.

It is interesting also to see how the committee stage of a Private Bill, now conducted by an impartial committee of four members, who hear the cases of promoters and opponents in much the same way as a court of justice, has gradually evolved, after controversy, from an original form of committee composed of large numbers of members having personal, local or professional knowledge of the subject of the Bill.

Volume II will contain the author's "Historical Notes" on the Standing Orders, embodying the researches upon which the whole is based.

F. N. KEEN.

THE THEOLOGY OF F. D. MAURICE, by Alec Vidler. *S.C.M. Press.* 8s. 6d.

Canon Vidler's volume is not only noteworthy as an achievement in itself, but also as a very important contribution to contemporary theological thought. To have compressed the 5,000,000 words which Maurice wrote into little more than 200 pages, and yet to have maintained both the perspective and the organic unity of Maurice's thought as faithfully as he has done, is of itself to have accomplished a most difficult task, and, whilst the author

is mainly concerned with Maurice's contribution to specifically Anglican interests, the book thoroughly deserves the widest possible reception from all Christian thinkers.

The significance of this can be seen if we remember that the two most potent influences in non-Roman theology at the present time are Augustine on the one hand and Kierkegaard on the other, both of whom made their approach to Christianity out of their own experience of deep, personal frustration. The result is that at the moment the most influential streams of theological thinking begin with the human experience of disobedience, frustration and sin; they are in fact theologies which are coloured by the conviction of the sinfulness of man. Not so Maurice. For him, the starting point of Christian theology is the fact of God's redemption of man. In Jesus Christ God declares that men belong to His Kingdom and that He wills that men should be regarded as having that status. That is indeed their true status, and nothing, not even the rebellion of men, can alter that primary fact. The centre of the Maurician theology is the reality of the Kingdom of God, and the true distinction between the Church and the world, therefore, is not so much the distinction between the saved and the unsaved as between those who know that that is their true status and accept it, and those who do not. Out of that root conviction stem obvious and important consequences. The Church is primarily a declaratory body called to be a witness in its own life and organization to the reality of the Kingdom. Its orders of ministry and its sacraments are, basically, the instruments it uses to make its central declarations. Baptism is a declaratory act proclaiming that the child is a member of that Kingdom, and the Eucharist both declares the point at which that Kingdom was made manifest, the consummation that God wills for society, and the reality of Christ's continued presence with men as the bond of that

true society.

Further, if God wills that men should be treated as members of His Kingdom, then the primary instruments of society, home and nation, are no less the instruments of God for the accomplishment of His purpose, and the Church is called to assert that that is their true nature with all the ethical consequences which spring out of that seminal idea.

New Testament scholars to-day work with a richer conception of the Kingdom than was possible to Maurice, but there can be no doubt that it is to what may be called a transmuted Maurician theology that New Testament scholarship is driving us. Canon Vidler has, in fact, given us what may prove to be a decisive and creative little book.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT.

ON BEING CANADIAN, by the Rt. Hon. Vincent Massey. *J. M. Dent.* 12s. 6d.

CACHE LAKE COUNTRY: Life in the Canadian North Woods, by John J. Rowlands and illustrated by Henry B. Kane. *Adam & Charles Black.* 15s.

Here are two splendid books about Canada, widely different in approach. One is formal; the other, informal. One originated in the conference rooms of Ottawa and London; the other, under the clear Ontario sky. Both, however, are valid and true. Both are labours of love and, in both cases, the authors have conveyed some of their own delight to the reader.

Many people here will remember Mr. Massey as Canadian High Commissioner in London during the crucial years, 1935 to 1946. To his own countrymen, he is known not only as a diplomat and man of affairs but also as a patron of the arts. His present book is the sincere testament of an intelligent Canadian, aware of both the political and the cultural facets of North American civilization—the mature opinion of one who has had great opportunities and has accepted great responsibilities in the service of his

country.

Mr. Massey sets out clearly and briefly the successive stages in the evolution of Canadian independence, thus earning the gratitude of the student of Canada's recent history. He is, of course, a staunch supporter of Anglo-Canadian friendship, writing, in his last chapter: "I believe in the Commonwealth of Nations, within whose bounds we have found freedom, and outside which our national life would lose its independent being."

Anyone who is interested in out-door Canada—particularly the Ontario north country where the art of the Group of Seven found its inspiration—will enjoy Mr. Rowlands' *Cache Lake Country*. (This name and some others in the book are fictitious but, throughout his narrative, he shows a deep respect for accuracy in description. In this, he is nobly aided by Mr. Kane, who contributes more than 400 finely-drawn illustrations of this austere and fascinating country of rock, lake and bush and its wild life.)

Together Mr. Rowlands and Mr. Kane have done a real service to all who venture into the Canadian north woods by recording—in detail—much of the practical *know-how*, with which the Indians furnish themselves with the necessities of life in this untamed region, using materials that are ready to hand. We are given sound recipes for making moccasins, sleeping-bags, food-caches and many other things.

In addition to what might be called the scout value of the book, Mr. Rowlands reveals some of the wisdom which he has gained in years of timber-cruising. Here is a characteristic passage:

A good woodsman has patience. He realizes he can't change Nature nor hurry her. He doesn't fret because a river runs the wrong way for his journey, doesn't cuss over being wind-bound for days on an island in a big lake. He knows he can't lower the hills to make a portage easier, and in winter he won't try to fight a blizzard. He learns early that rushing does not often get you where you are going any faster than taking it quietly. Wise in the ways of the woods, he realizes that often the longest way is the

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shortest. He never takes any more steps than he needs to, and he knows just where to sink his axe to bring down a tree with the least number of strokes. In the far away cities they call that efficiency and teach men to do things with the fewest motions. Up here they have no name for it, but just watch a good woodsman pick up a canoe and walk away with it and you will know what I'm driving at. And what's more, you'll probably learn to live longer.

There is an artistic description of the days when the leaden weight of winter is lifted from a continent, as the ice goes out of the rivers and spring sweeps upward over North America on a million wings. The author of this superb book about Canada is himself a citizen of the United States. Thereby, possibly, hangs a moral.

Both books, in their different ways, give an impression of a land in its spring-time, standing on the threshold of great adventures which our generation can hardly estimate.

LESLIE BISHOP.

BRITISH MALAYA, by Sir Frank Swettenham. *Allen and Unwin*. 21s.

Malaya retired from the limelight of Japanese invasion until June 1948, when the communist revolt caused the despatch of a Guards Brigade to the scene, and once more brought the school atlases from bookshelves all over the country.

For that reason above all, a new edition of *British Malaya* should not pass unnoticed. Admittedly it is not a book for the general reader and could not directly dispel the clouds of ignorance which obscure Malaya from the public eye; but it is a valuable book for the educators and the seekers after knowledge. The subject is topical. The style is lively and the tale is one of courage and adventure.

British Malaya was first published in 1906. It is the classic account of the growth of British influence in Malaya until that date. In 1929, Sir Frank Swettenham added a new chapter on political and economic developments in the intervening years, which is

perhaps useful as a footnote to the main text. But the addition of a further preface dated 1946 is undoubtedly a mistake. Its tone is querulous and unconstructive; and it spoils the fine perspective of the story. How much better if, instead of confusing us with yet another preface, the author had set about the elimination of already existing confusions caused by the passage of time and had pruned certain material which has now lost its relevance. The book would then earn itself a permanent place in the historical library.

It would deserve that place primarily because the story it tells is so interesting an example of the expansion of British influence in the last century. It shows the outposts of the East India Company struggling to develop trade with primitive peoples, with scant support from the Board of the Company and none at all from the Government. It shows how the foresight and persistence of one man 130 years ago has resulted in the conversion of a small and uncultivated island into one of the world's greatest centres of trade, the port of Singapore. It shows the haphazard origin of the system of Resident Officers in some of the Malay States; a post with heavy responsibilities but without effective authority. It gives credit to those Englishmen who devoted a large part of their lives to the development of an efficient and honest administration. It illustrates, without overemphasis, the benefits reaped by the local inhabitants, in the form of peace, order and prosperity. And it is especially valuable for the sympathetic picture it paints both of the Malayan people and of the hard-working Chinese merchants living peaceably amongst them. Had it not been for the occupation of Malaya by the Japanese and the subsequent influx of undesirable immigrants, there would have been no communist revolt there to-day; and the school atlases would have gathered more dust.

NIGEL BRUCE.

CHINESE ESCAPADE, by Laurance Tipton. *Macmillan*. 16s.

THREE YEARS IN THE LEVANT, by Richard Pearse. *Macmillan*. 12s. 6d.

We are told on the last page of Mr. Tipton's thrilling book that Britain, deeply occupied in her own affairs, reoccupied Hong Kong and with that ceased to take any further active interest in the Chinese problem. The reward, he thinks, will be reaped later on.

His own experiences in the Chinese maelstrom are most vividly described ; no greater contrast can be imagined than the horrors of his Japanese prison, the details of which are almost incredible, and the time when, on parole in Peking, he could, for instance, "embark after breakfast in a punt and drift among water-lilies still studded with sparkling morning dew." Then in the winter of 1943, in another Japanese prison, "bankers and shipping magnates spent hours going over the ash-dumps from the kitchen and hot-water boilers, tirelessly scraping, raking and sifting the ashes in the hope of finding pieces of coke or partially-burnt coal." However there was to come the much happier time when our author, who has spent many years in China and speaks the language, was enabled to join the guerrillas. Neither he nor a friend of his were married, which greatly concerned Yu-min, the commander. "This war," he pointed out, "may yet go on for some time. It is possible that both of you might be killed or captured in the next Japanese raid. It appals me to think that you might die without leaving an heir to tend to the graves of your honourable family. We have in the Middle School of the Four Virtues several well-educated and attractive girls who would make excellent wives. Please give consideration to this." They inquired whether such a marriage would be regarded as a 'resistance war' marriage, terminable at the end of the war, or whether it would be final. This is indeed an original and valuable book, particularly

as affairs in China are as yet far from stability. Here we are taken behind many scenes.

Not for so long a period has Mr. Pearse dwelt in the Levant, but his time in the Field Security Service of the Intelligence Corps has resulted in a most striking picture for us of the complications in Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine. He found himself isolated in a district with eighty villages, none of which possessed a single shop, and in the whole area there was no doctor, book or newspaper. In fact the condition in Syria, with malaria practically in every house and man's inhumanity to man extremely prevalent, causes one's sympathy for that part of the Arab world to be severely tried. Mr. Pearse did his utmost to bring what solace he could to the sorely stricken peasants ; as a Cornish-

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man he had always wanted to see Phoenicia and Tyre, which latter is, he tells us, a terrestrial paradise, but the people are hopelessly inert and apathetic. One day the English driver of a lorry which capsized was badly injured and for an hour 300 men and youths stared at him and did nothing. This was not due to anti-British sentiment; they would have behaved in the same manner if the injured man had been one of their own.

The short journey from Tyre to Nahariya, a Jewish seaside resort, was like going from the Orient to Europe, for the Jews lived not in dreamland, but in a world of stark, active reality, tackling their problems with unequalled zest. If the Druze had had their wishes fulfilled one problem would soon have been solved—we are taken to the meeting of a French officer and a Druze chieftain who were old college chums. They had not seen each other for many years and after falling on each other's neck and laughing over college incidents, discussing the Russian menace and so forth, the Druze then no longer concealed his anti-French sentiments, telling his surprised and confused guest that they wanted the French to depart as soon as possible. In Syria the Government, says Mr. Pearse, instead of grappling with the problems that face the country, instead of ordering doctors out into the villages to save life, they order anti-French demonstrations; instead of appropriating some of the disgusting wealth of the feudal lords in the shape of taxes, the Government demands a seat in the U.N. Instead of carrying out land reform, it clamours for a voice in international affairs. The hygienic conditions are such that, although the French Army would enlist any man in possession of his limbs and oriental faculties, the British medical officers rejected 23 out of 24 volunteers, all the rejects being chronic sufferers from malaria.

It would have been well if the ordinary British propaganda magazines had likewise been rejected. Tens of thousands have been distributed every month all

over the Middle East to an illiterate population. But they are in great demand as wrapping paper. The Germans, on the other hand, gave radio sets to café owners and with such good results that it was believed all over that Arab world that Abu Ali, in other words Hitler, was a Moslem, with a thoroughly Moslem mother.

HENRY BAERLEIN

THE NOVELS OF THOMAS LOVE PEACOCK. Edited with Introduction and Notes by David Garnett. *Rupert Hart-Davis.* 18s.

Rather more than 26 years ago I heard Sir Walter Raleigh lecture on the novels of Peacock. He was at his best, wise, witty, and at times uncommonly funny. He believed that one of the principal duties of a lecturer on literature is to make his hearers want to read the authors under discussion. I went straight out and bought a pocket edition of Peacock's novels and it has been my constant travelling companion ever since and at this moment it is being rebound. Nothing could have been more timely than the arrival of Mr. Hart-Davis's handsome volume, stoutly bound and printed in clear, well spaced type. Miss Joan Hassall's delightfully Gothic wrapper, with its courtly dancers and its well-fed and well-wined conversationalists catches to perfection the spirit of the tales.

As for the editor, there could be no better choice than Mr. David Garnett. His work throughout is discreet, learned, and admirably informative. Not even Sherlock Holmes in his pursuit of criminals was more successful than Mr. Garnett has been in tracking to their lair the innumerable quotations that Peacock used so freely to bespangle and decorate his work. That is one of the reasons why the admirers of Peacock will always consist of a comparatively small company of bookish readers; these faithful ones are ever on the look out for recruits, and they should be easier to enrol now than at

any time since Peacock wrote. In 1927 Mr. Priestley pointed out that in *Gryll Grange* Peacock satirizes the modern world; that the mole-hills he turned into mountains have actually become mountains. "That", as Mr. Garnett says, "is even more striking to-day: the mountains have grown larger and we are living in their shadow. Peacock's novels are full of cranks and system-mongers. To-day they have become the statesmen who plan our destinies and direct our actions."

Never previously have I seen Peacock's political position summed up so acutely as in Mr. Garnett's description of him as a radical individualist, an admirer of Cobbett, a Utilitarian who believed in *laissez-faire*. Peacock distrusted Governments and hated State interference, loathed corruption and tyranny and had no illusions about the mob.

These strong dislikes would become boring to the reader if they were not offset by the author's tremendous high spirits, his tenderness, especially when he is writing about young people, his poetry, his brilliant talk, his blend of irony and good humour, and his gift for comic characterization, seen at its zenith in the superb portrait of Prince Seithenyn, the most undaunted drunkard of them all. Peacock's sense of prose style in narrative and dialogue never deserted him. He was incapable of writing anything woolly or slipshod, and the contempt which he makes Desmond express, in *Melincourt*, for certain pedants is a reflection of what he himself felt about writers and scholars who professed to be edified by writing they did not understand.

The pleasant country house parties which provide a setting for six of the stories give opportunity for the excellent cuisine, the vintage wines, and the endless conversation that is their *raison d'être*. A word must be said also for the occasional descriptions of landscape charming in their precision which remind the reader that Peacock was not merely a wit and a

scholar. He never allowed the poetic element to remain far from the surface. It is an essential part of his work and when he allows it to emerge, it never fails to delight. *Maid Marian* was called by its author "a comic Romance of the Twelfth Century . . . rivers castles forests abbies monks maids kings and banditti dancing before me like a masked ball." It has plenty of charm and action.

The fact remains that in all his stories Peacock had the immense advantage of being an author with something to say and an exact knowledge of how to say it. In a time of turgid and longwinded storytellers his exact and fastidious talent is naturally a delight to discriminating readers. I can only hope that their increasing numbers will bear witness to his still widening popularity.

ERIC GILLET

Our Advice in the Present Distress:

"And it shall come to pass, that WHOSOEVER shall CALL on the name of the LORD shall be delivered."
(Joel ii. 32.)

THE CALL

○ Lord God Almighty, I call upon Thee for deliverance for myself and for my family in adversities and accidents, and for PROTECTION in earthquakes, floods, and all convulsions of Nature. I also call upon Thee for PROTECTION in dangers, such as rioting and other social disorders, arising out of the confusion accompanying the end of the world's unhappy conditions. And I intreat Thee to make haste, O God, to frustrate the godless menace in Britain; to redeem the world from sin, sickness, and death; and to take it under Thy immediate Governance. Amen.

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BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Does Aldous Huxley sing in his bath? It is just conceivable that as he scrubs away the stains of contact with lesser men he allows a couplet to reverberate, with disdainful and disgusted *fortissimo* first line, and the second, to betray a hint of wistfulness, *rallentando* :

I care for nobody, no, not I
And nobody cares for me.

His new tract *APE AND ESSENCE* (*Chatto & Windus*. 7s. 6d.) is a film script of events occurring in Hollywood and its environs in the year 2108 over a century after the third world war which left most of the globe dangerously radioactive. In his varying degrees of emphasis on the degradation of man, Mr. Huxley contrives to be most right when he is most depressing. Nevertheless, had he chosen to mix his splendid gifts with love, what an evangelist he would have made!

The Narrator says of Dr. Poole, a member of the Re-Discovery Expedition to North America :

Our friend is a good Congregationalist, but, alas, on the liberal side. Which means that he has never given the Prince of this world His ontological due. To put it brutally, he doesn't believe in Him.

In 2108 worshippers repeat "Glory to Belial in the lowest" as they make the sign of the horns, so for 'Prince' read 'Devil'.

Casting him out

And, broadly, the difference between men in 1949 and those of the nineteenth century is in this same matter of belief in the devil. The Victorians never doubted that he stalked the earth ready to devour, and to be devoured. Now, having cast him out we are yet left with the fear that in the guise of something we call 'human nature' he has won after all. Collected into *IDEAS AND BELIEFS OF THE VICTORIANS* (*Sylvan Press*. 21s.) are some 50 talks from the Third Programme of the B.B.C. which, in the words of the preamble, "examine the assumptions of the Victorian age, appraise its ideas, and re-assess its controversies." Given by 'experts' in the various fields, these

are useful weapons in the struggle to determine how far the Victorian theory of progress was justified, how valid were the religious tenets of the period and how the liberal idea worked. If it is true that man learns from history these studies shed light on current problems ; if not, they still shed light.

Victoriana

Hector Bolitho has not cluttered *THE REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA* (*Collins*. 16s.) with metaphysical concepts. This is the straightforward story of one who frequently mistook irrationality for firmness—and performed the miracle of evolving from a pleasure loving Hanoverian into the epitome of British respectability. So successfully did she impose her personality even as a constitutional ruler that she lifted the monarchy out of the unpopularity into which the four Georges had allowed it to founder and proved herself thereby no ordinary, self-effacing Victorian matron.—“Wales, come here,” said the Prince Consort as he presented Mr. Tupper to his son. And in *MARTIN TUPPER : His Rise and Fall* (*Constable*. 18s.) Derek Hudson invites this generation to come here and have presented the man whose commonplace thoughts were bound up in numerous editions of *Proverbial Philosophy*, who perpetrated endless and mostly tedious verse and who became a butt. (“To dream that you have written all Mr. Tupper’s Works (and on waking to find you haven’t) is very lucky”—Professor Punch’s *Dream-Book*.) It was his extraordinary facility and his inability to reject that were his undoing ; for surely the industry and doggedness of his career should be the attributes of genius. Bore he might have been, but Mr. Hudson’s study of him, and of publishing, of literary contemporaries and of the pattern of nineteenth century living provided by Tupper’s scrap-books, make a book without a boring sentence.

"The great affirmer"

Of the £400 raised as a testimonial to Martin Tupper, the sum of two guineas was subscribed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of *YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS* (*Ernest Benn*. 25s.). Catherine Drinker Bowen's first-rate biography, too, is a study of a way of life, contemporary with Victoria, across the Atlantic. Grandfather Abiel and his son Oliver share the honours of the book; *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table* was published while its author's son was a boy at Harvard in 1857. Thus, to be sixteen then, and to die in 1935, active and interested (he was still delivering majority opinions as a Justice of the Supreme Court in 1932), is to see America growing into shape and completeness. With great but unobtrusive scholarship, the development of man and country is here brilliantly unfolded.

Ways of life

Another full and scholarly work is *AMERICA THROUGH BRITISH EYES*, compiled and edited by Allan Nevins (*Geoffrey Cumberlege*: *Oxford University Press*. 25s.). Here are collected the descriptions of places and people from the journeys of 160 years. The writers range from William Cobbett to Lord Tweedsmuir, from Trollope, Dickens and Matthew Arnold to J. A. Spender, Mary Agnes Hamilton and Graham Hutton. There is no excuse for rash statements about the American way of life by the stay-at-home who reads this book, nor should the traveller be other than fortified by its wise interpretations. —

When the windjammers left the shelter of South Shields harbour on a favourable wind for their destinations far away in the last days of February 1849

Britain's oldest provincial evening newspaper, which according to its prospectus sought to interest "persons in various parts of the world" and has done so ever since, had its birth. *THE SHIELDS GAZETTE CENTENARY BOOK* tells this story of enterprise and achievement in pictures and letterpress whose lay out calls for the warmest congratu-

lations to Donald Haigh, its designer. News items, posters, advertisements, and particularly the "Literary Supplement" of April 1890, catch and hold the delighted attention. — From the background of a newspaper to *FAMILY BACKGROUND*—by Gladys Scott Thomson (*Jonathan Cape*. 10s. 6d.), who now completes her researches into the early history of the Russells, Earls and Dukes of Bedford. The merchant squires of Dorset spread into Buckinghamshire and Cambridge, founding properties at Chenies and Thorney Abbey with Woburn Abbey as a kind of focal point. The quest for inventories, builders' accounts, numberless furnishing and decoration items, from plumbing to plate, was obviously laborious but the author has tackled it with all her characteristic zest to show how noble households in England were run between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries.

Conflict and calm

A member of a Cumberland household is discussed by Herbert Read in a new edition of *WORDSWORTH* (*Faber & Faber*. 15s.). Victorian reticence and his own "long-sustained hypocrisy" ignored the facts of the poet's association with Annette Vallon, whom he deserted in France as soon as their child was born. Mr. Read contends that "Wordsworth, as a character and a poet, is inexplicable without this key to his emotional development," and that his thwarted emotions found "an external and objective compensation in his poetry." This is what may be called 'psychological biography' at its best, to be recommended as a balance to more conventional expositions of Wordsworth's poetry and philosophy. — Still going north, we reach a croft in the western highlands of Scotland where Margaret Leigh lives. Her *SPADE AMONG THE RUSHES* (*Phoenix House*. 12s. 6d.) is autobiography in isolation and the more compelling for that. How she became a member of the sparse community in Smirisbury, coping with byre and barn, haymaking, drought,

fences and drains, winter nights, and with fire, water and bread, is unself-consciously—that is, with no accent on drama—related. This Oxford graduate who chooses to be alone with hill, sea, sky and burn, displays not misanthropy but a mind at peace.

Far from home

Another voluntary exile was Joseph Conrad, whose works are being republished by *J. M. Dent*. The latest, *NOTES ON LIFE AND LETTERS* (7s. 6d.), is surely among the most readable of his books. As he himself says, the collection has more to do with life than letters, yet the essays on Henry James, Daudet, de Maupassant, Anatole France, Turgenev and Stephen Crane are equally valuable, as vehicles of his acute critical faculty, with the rest of the book. "Autocracy and War" (1905) and "The Crime of Partition" (1919) appeared first in *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, and other titles, such as "The Life after Death", "Tales of the Sea", "Poland Revisited" and "Confidence", indicate something of the scope of his interests.— Still another exile, this time to join the distinguished band of Irish writers abroad, is Sean O'Casey. *INISHFALLEN FARE THEE WELL* (*Macmillan*. 16s.) is a further long instalment of his autobiographical musings. It is a rushing torrent of a book, with words bubbling, cascading in spate. It is not to be denied that the style is somewhat tiring, not least because it engenders unwilling envy and the urge to imitate such felicity—but a chapter at a time is a safe prescription for full enjoyment. His connections with the Abbey Theatre in Dublin and its Lady Gregory make, for one of his admirers—who trembled with awe as she examined the portraits in its vestibule less than a year ago—, some of the most interesting parts of his book.

Life in the raw

For very different reasons, another playwright too, August Strindberg of

Sweden, left his native land. He died in 1912 at the age of 63 clasping, somewhat incongruously, a Bible, honoured by his countrymen at last. In time for the centenary celebration of his birth is *EIGHT FAMOUS PLAYS* (*Gerald Duckworth*. 15s.), translated by Edwin Björkman and N. Erichsen. Alan Harris has written an Introduction which is a compact biography, disastrous marriages and all, of this gloomy and self-pitying man. How truly the introducer says that "the first approach to his best-known work is apt to produce the same nightmare feeling as the first approach to psycho-analytical doctrine"! However, the B.B.C. has cushioned the shock, and, providing there is no attempt to read the plays in bulk, they hold the somewhat morbid attention that all such case histories induce.— Back to Ireland for the origin of one more playwright, "buried in the church of St. Martin's in the Fields" at the age of 29. He was *GEORGE FARQUHAR* (*Mermaid Series: Ernest Benn*. 8s. 6d.), born in 1678, whose four plays, "The Constant Couple", "The Twin-Rivals", "The Recruiting Officer" and "The Beaux' Stratagem", are here reprinted with William Archer's Introduction. The second part of this, entitled "Critical", originally published in the *FORTNIGHTLY*, compares Farquhar with other dramatists of his group. In coarseness, brutality and "sheer nastiness" he comes well behind Wycherley, Congreve, Vanbrugh, and William Archer argued that he was "progressing towards a sane and humane form of comedy when the pen fell from his hand." The first section of the Introduction, "Biographical", reveals in the plays much self-portraiture in scenes of squalor and amorosness. Leigh Hunt says one of Farquhar's daughters was a domestic servant up to the time of her death in 1764, a sufficient commentary on the playwright's personal mismanagement.

GRACE BANYARD